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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Firms, Organization, and Capital Market Frictions
By
Kurt James Horner
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Guillaume Rocheteau, Chair
Firms and other organizations are typically modeled in economics as a function that com-
bines some set of inputs to produce desired output. Such organizations, in the real world,
are often constrained relative to such a simple model by frictions in output markets, frictions
in the input markets, and internal frictions due to sub-optimal organization. The first of
these frictions (output markets) are perhaps the best explored in the literature. As such,
my work seeks to add to the literature exploring the latter two issues. The first chapter
of this dissertation examines firm organizational structure as a coordination game with pri-
vate information, and demonstrates conditions where joint ventures between firms should
be favored over mergers. The second chapter examines religious organizations using a club
good model where members have norm-based utility functions, and finds a large variety of
equilibirium organizational models. The final chapter is a search model of physical capital
markets, allowing for search-in-use (an analog to search-on-the-job in macro-labor models),
which shows two channels by which capital market frictions can diminish growth. Together,
the papers represent the beginning of a research path examining previously neglected con-
straints on economic growth.
viii
Chapter 1
Smaller is Better?: The Implications
of Organizational Form
Coordination decisions between firms with complementary products are examined while al-
lowing for managers to choose among organizational forms. Due to private information
about coordination costs, contracts (joint-venture) can cause coordination failure when co-
ordination is first best, while merger can cause coordination when coordination is not first
best. Extensions where an organizational form is banned or made the conventional form are
explored. Decisions are more likely to be first best when a convention is imposed, and a
convention that favors contracts over mergers is most optimal.
1
1.1 Introduction
It is common to treat the firm as simply a production function that converts inputs to out-
puts. The internal organization of the firm is often taken as a given, when such matters
are discussed at all. Yet, at a most fundamental level, a large firm with multiple divisions
or product lines can be thought of as a bunch of smaller firms placed under a common
organization. We need an explanation for why this organization might be chosen over a
contractual relationship between separate firms. To the extent that models discuss whether
firms will merge or remain separate, it is often assumed that one decision or the other is
always more optimal (typically merging). While various attempts have been made to explain
organizational form, the explanations vary widely and there is no settled consensus. This
paper attempts to bring us closer to an eventual consensus by examining how organizational
choices are made.
The model framework to be used here is similar to that from Hart and Holmstrom (2010).
A key conclusion of their model is that both integration (merger) and non-integration (con-
tract) involve deviations from the first best social optimum. If two firms that are considering
coordinating 1 try to remain separate, they will sometimes miss opportunities to successfully
coordinate. Yet, if they merge, they will now sometimes coordinate when they should not
do so. Two sets of questions naturally arise. First, how do managers come to agree upon an
organizational form and what factors influence that outcome? Second, can policy measures
be taken that bring overall coordination decisions closer to the first best?
This paper describes a model of two managers considering having their two firms coordinate.
The managers can have their firms remain independent, can draw up a contract that shifts
profits between the firms, or they can merge their firms into a single firm. The model is
simulated over a range of parameter values and for a variety of alternative rules governing
1Coordination could mean a joint-venture on a new product or improving complementarity between their
existing products. This is not to be confused with collusion between firms producing substitutable products,
since that would imply that the firms’ gains come at the expense of consumer welfare.
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the availability of the organizational forms. These alternative rules are compared to the first
best outcome and to each other.
There are several main results of interest. First, that biasing the managers towards either
mergers or contracts, improves outcomes relative to not doing so. I will refer to this insti-
tutional bias as a convention in favor of one organizational form or the other. Second, that
having an environment where both mergers and contracts can occur is at least as good as
banning one organizational form or the other, and usually better. Finally, that the best
outcomes occur under a convention biased toward contracts.
This paper is inspired in part by the experience of craft industries in Emilia-Romagna, Italy.
This region, one of Italy’s 22 administrative districts, was one of the poorest regions in Italy
just after the Second World War. The region now has the highest per capita income in all of
Italy, a third higher than the EU average. Emilia-Romagna is unusual for having a manu-
facturing heavy economy with very small firms, an outcome which would seem to contradict
a great deal of the economic literature about firm size. The region’s unusual business envi-
ronment could be explained by their policy of providing public support for small businesses
(particularly new firms) funded by local tax revenues. Alternatively, some have suggested
that the network of small firms in the region is founded in local culture. Regardless of the
cause of this organizational convention, the model in this paper presents provides a potential
explanation for how this environment might be responsible for the region’s economic success.
1.2 Literature
The unique contribution of this paper is to explore the choice of organizational form. In
particular, the firm managers in my model will end up with one of three decision rules to
handle a coordination problem, which correspond to independent, contractual and merged
organizational forms. While comparisons between organizational forms have been done,
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both empirically and theoretically, how managers come to agree upon an organization has
not been well explored. This literature review is broken up into three subsections.
First, I review empirical literature on organizational form to clarify the phenomena described
by the model. There is a vast literature on merger policy, not explored here, which focuses
on the effect of mergers on the consumer. However, this paper is focused on the managers
of firms and how they come to choose an organization, which means exploring more obscure
aspects of the literature. Due to the economic literature tending to be focused on mergers,
much of the empirical literature on networked business environments (resembling the contract
form in my model) is drawn from sociology.
Second, I survey theories of the firm and how that relates to organizational choice. Any
theory of why firms exist should also be able to hint at why mergers would occur, or why
they might not occur when a viable contractual option is available. The three organizational
forms in this paper also bear a resemblance to the market / network / hierarchy trichotomy
popular in the sociology literature.
Finally, I review recent work related to organizational choice. Readers who want to reference
the most direct influences on the model environment should turn to that subsection.
1.2.1 Empirical
A review of the merger literature can be found in Andrade et al. (2001). It is widely known
that mergers tend to occur in waves, and that these waves seem to be triggered by shocks to
industry structure (major cost changes, either regulatory or resource driven). The primary
equilibrium in my model is consistent with this phenomenon, in that firm managers deter-
mine their desired organizational form based on an assessment of their own cost structure.
While not directly explored in the model, a systematic change in costs could trigger a dif-
ferent organizational outcome.
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Davidson and Ferrett (2007) suggests that mergers can occur to exploit complementarities
in R&D costs. The model below assumes that coordination generates additional revenue due
to complementary products. The exact nature of how those revenues are generated is not
explored, and the model would be consistent with an R&D based motivation for coordina-
tion. Mergers are not always successful, a situation explored in Weber and Camerer (2003)
using an experiment involving distinct corporate cultures. The model below features private
costs that cannot be negotiated over, which can lead to mergers creating a net loss for one
or both parties.
The relative desirability of mergers versus contractual relationships is central to this paper.
Gugler and Siebert (2007) uses evidence from the semiconductor industry to show that joint
ventures are not necessarily any less efficient than mergers. Given the potential market
power effects of mergers, they conclude that joint ventures might be preferable to mergers.
Similarly, Jandik and Kali (2009) provides evidence that as the quality of legal systems in-
creases, firms tend to prefer joint ventures to mergers.
There is a significant sociological literature contrasting contractual versus hierarchical busi-
ness environments. Networks between firms in the New York City garment industry are
explored in Uzzi (1997), showing a large number of firms interacting contractually rather
than merging. Similarly, Lazerson (1988) conducted a survey of small manufacturing firms
in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, again showing a stable contractual environment. The
American computer industry was examined in Saxenian (1996), and concluded that loose
networks in California’s Silicon Valley outperformed the merger friendly environment along
Route 128 in Massachusetts.
We should hesitate to advocate contractual arrangements in all cases. Schrank and Whit-
ford (2011) document numerous cases where networked economies seem to underperform,
primarily where actors with low degrees of competency transmit poor methods through the
network leading to increased costs. The results from the model in this paper do indicate
5
that simply banning mergers as an organizational option would not be optimal, even if there
are broad advantages from promoting contractual arrangements.
1.2.2 Theoretical
In the broadest terms, theories of the firm break down into four categories, shaped by the
relative emphasis of two dichotomies. The first dichotomy is the control vs. transaction
costs distinction, where the firm is described alternately as either a structure that facilitates
decision authority (control) or one that allows the participants to overcome transaction costs
from using markets. The second dichotomy is whether or not the firm arises from ex-ante
incentive alignment or a need to have ex-post decision governance. The typology above is
strongly informed by Gibbons (2005).
In the case of control theories, the seminal work is Knight (1921), where the firm is described
as a mechanism for an entrepreneur to bear the risks while reaping the rewards of a successful
project. In this view, the employees trade their potential gains for a consistent wage. When
applied to mergers, this would suggest that firms merge in order to create a clear decision-
maker that can override individual managers (prevent hold-up).
For transaction cost theories, the key paper is Coase (1937), where the non-market structure
of the firm overcomes transaction costs that would be too burdensome in a market. The
firm is, in this view, an equilibrium between tasks that can be handled by markets and those
best handled by command. In the realm of mergers, this implies that the costs of merging
are weighed against the cost of coordinating separately and that the lower cost option wins
out. In a Coase framework the trade offs that are resolved by firms involve different types
of costs, while in a Knight framework, firms resolve differences in time preference between
agents.
For ex-ante incentive theories, the firm’s organization is chosen in order to ensure that the
6
intended projects are carried out, even when some people in the organization are reluctant.
In Holmstrom and Tirole (1991), ownership of key assets confers the incentive to make
the project successful, and in turn induces the owners to pay employees enough to ensure
success. In Grossman and Hart (1986), ex-ante bargaining leads to property-rights in the
firm accruing to the largest investor. In the context of coordination decisions, the ex-ante
incentive framework would suggest that organizational choice will be driven by the party
that gains most from coordinating trying to maximize the chance of coordinating.
For ex-post decision theories, the firm is a mechanism to overcome barriers to coordination
where its governance structure is simply what is needed for proper decisions after the firm
is formed. In Williamson (1971), the manager’s fiat removes rent-seeking by subordinates.
In Klein (1996), firms are created as an adaptation to overcome uncertainty. When talking
about merger decisions, the ex-post framework would imply that mergers occur when needed
to ensure coordination (implying high uncertainty as to what the individual managers will
do once costs are revealed).
It is also worth noting a sort of anti-theory of the firm, most strongly delineated in Alchian
and Demsetz (1972). Here the firm is just a contract by another name and organizational
form is considered chimerical. In practice, this view places a padlock on the “black box” of
the firm, preventing further examination. The insights on the role of monitoring in Alchian
and Demsetz (1972) are quite interesting, but their sweeping dismissal of organizational
concerns perhaps goes too far.
Finally, the model environment bears some similarities to the market / network / hierarchy
typology from the sociological literature first described in Powell (1990). In particular,
the contract organizational form in this paper can be viewed as analogous to a “network”
environment. As noted in the empirical review above, sociologists have drawn attention to
thriving regions that tend to organize collaboratively rather than by mergers. It is hoped
that this paper will encourage greater attention to such environments by economists as well.
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My model will follow in the ex-ante incentive tradition, by depicting organizational choice
as a means to incentivize coordination when the realization of costs is not yet known. I also
allow organizational forms to vary in the types of errors they are prone to, which resembles
the transaction costs framework. However, given that my organizational forms also vary on
the basis of who retains the final decision to coordinate or not, the model is also consistent
with the control framework. I will also examine whether it is helpful to set a conventional
organizational form (whether chosen by policy or culture), and whether this brings decisions
closer to the first best.
1.2.3 Recent Work on Organizations
As noted above, this paper borrows much from Hart and Holmstrom (2010), which unsur-
prisingly falls in the ex-ante incentive camp, given the authors. In their paper, the actual
decision of whether to merge or use contracts is not considered. Instead the focus is on how
likely a particular organizational form will be to cause over or under coordination relative
to the first best. An extension of that paper, Legros and Newman (2013), does consider
organizational decisions and finds that not only does this cause cusps to occur in the supply
curve, but that for a range of consumer demand, a market would even see a mixture of
merged and unmerged firms. This opens up the potential of explaining the distribution of
firm size in the economy.
Hart and Holmstrom (2010) is also notable for being relatively agnostic along the control
vs. contract axis. While their depiction of organizational decisions are reminiscent of the
power/certainty trade-off from Knight (1921), the fact that integration faces unique draw-
backs (over-coordination) that are the reverse of non-integration (under-coordination) is
more reminiscent of the Coasian view, where markets and hierarchies have offsetting bene-
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fits and flaws.
Another recent paper that informs this one is Van den Steen (2010), which comes down
firmly on the side of the Knightian control perspective. In that paper, the firm is one of two
possible equilibria when determining whether two agents should work together on a project.
The model here has some similarities to Hart and Holmstrom, in that there are two agents
whose actions are distinct but where a gain from coordinating can occur, and the question
is whether and how coordination should occur. The main distinction is that Van den Steen
is essentially only considering half of the outcome space that Hart and Holmstrom consider
(the half where coordination is socially optimal). This leads to a conclusion that the firm
solves the coordination problem without delving into possible drawbacks.
The interpretation of a key parameter in my model will draw from Hart and Moore (2008)
which describes how much of our organizational arrangements likely stem from a need to
define beforehand what sorts of payments can be made between parties. I will refer to the
costs that can be described in an agreement as being “contractible.” The fact that parties
can rarely, if ever, describe all of their costs causes sub-optimal decisions to be made and
there is no reason to assume that such errors can be easily re-negotiated once an organiza-
tional form has been adopted.
Although the model in this paper takes the revenue gain from coordination as a given, the
horizontal merger model in Huck et al. (2004) is relevant. The authors use organizational
structure to explain mergers. Their merged firms enforce a Stackelberg style order of produc-
tion, not unlike how my merged firm commands coordination. Going outside of economics
to political science, Jung and Lake (2011) uses a simulation model to investigate the ef-
fectiveness of organizational hierarchy. Their main result is hierarchy provides a certainty
of cooperation that can override other costs of hierarchy, which resembles the bias toward
coordination described in Hart and Holmstrom (2010) that also appears in the model below.
9
Negotiate
Bargaining
Type
Merger
Payouts
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Payouts
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Payouts
Merger
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Contract
Bargaining
Remain
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Stage 1 Stage 2 Decision Rule
Figure 1.1: Game Diagram
1.3 Model
There are two firms (A and B) that can coordinate their operations or not. By coordinating,
the two firms’ products are more likely to be purchased together causing both firms to enjoy
increased sales. Each firm has a manager who gains profits from the firm but also may incur
private costs from coordinating. The managers will attempt to use one of two organizational
alternatives to maximize the chance of successful coordination.
To determine organizational form, the two managers will play a two stage game that will
result in a particular organizational form whose decision rule will then be implemented and
payoffs realized. The structure of the game is depicted in figure 1.1. The managers have
two possible agreements (contract or merger) that can improve the chances of successful
coordination, relative to remaining independent. Under independence, coordination occurs
if both managers expect their individual payouts to be non-negative. The same is true under
contract, except that the two managers bargain over a share of the increased profits that will
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occur under coordination and make their decision based on the adjusted payouts. Finally,
under a merger, a headquarters is created to make the coordination decision, which has
the ability to impose coordination on the two managers. As with a contract, the managers
bargain over profit shares should coordination occur under merger. The bargaining and the
decision rules will be described in detail below.
1.3.1 Managers
Each firm has a manager who maximizes utility of the form:
Ui = pii + xi (1.1)
• pii are the profits realized by manager i
• xi are private costs borne solely by manager i (negative)
Focusing on the coordination decision, managers maximize ∆Ui which is the difference be-
tween the manager’s utility without coordinating and the manager’s utility when the two
firms coordinate (however they do so). This has the convenience of setting ∆Ui = 0 when
coordination does not occur, and it is not necessary to define the profits and private costs
to the managers under normal operations. The payouts of the game are in terms of ∆Ui.
When coordination occurs, there will be an increase in revenues and costs per:
zi = ri + ci (1.2)
• zi is manager i’s net gain from coordinating with other firm
• ri is the change in manager i’s revenue when coordinating (always non-negative) 2
2We could allow for negative revenue values, but since coordination disincentives already arise from the
negative costs, negative revenue is redundant and complicates the analysis.
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• ci is the change in manager i’s costs when coordinating (always negative) 3
The nature of the costs is best thought of as increased costs for that firm that only occur in the
coordination case. These could be organizational restructuring costs, training costs, unique
materials or even new equipment. These costs can also include psychic or interpersonal costs
that are difficult to enumerate. I also refer to zi as a net gain rather than profit, to emphasize
that a coordination decision that is profitable in an accounting sense may still be a net loss
in this model.
The reader may notice that ci seems to include xi. Specifically, define ∆xi = (1− θ)ci where
θ ∈ (0, 1). This parameter4 represents the degree to which the costs of coordinating are
contractible. It is likely that at least some of the costs of coordinating (particularly psychic
costs) cannot be sufficiently enumerated to allow the parties to craft an agreement that
mitigates them. The degree of contractability is assumed to be symmetric – that there are
no disparities in bargaining power or monitoring ability. This assumption will be relaxed
later.
The contractability parameter (θ) will assist in interpreting the results. For example, if θ = 1,
this would be a situation where all costs associated with coordination can be negotiated and
the term xi would vanish from the managers’ utility functions causing them to make their
decisions purely on the basis of realized profits. Similarly, if θ = 0, this would be a situation
where all of the costs of coordinating are private costs borne by the managers that cannot
be negotiated over.
Since a manager’s private costs are (1− θ)ci, the contractible profits would be ri + θci which
3The descriptions of the variables here differs from Hart and Holmstrom, particularly in that costs are
now all forms of cost, pecuniary or otherwise. Their model would be equivalent to ri = pii and ci = xi.
4Conceptually, this is similar to the contractability parameter in Hart and Moore (2008).
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is of course, equal to pii. Thus, a manager’s change in utility from coordinating would be:
∆Ui = ri + θci︸ ︷︷ ︸
pii
+ (1− θ)ci︸ ︷︷ ︸
xi
(1.3)
Given the above, the first best social optimum will be to coordinate if zA + zB ≥ 0. Even if
one of the two managers would take a loss from coordinating, as long as the positive z is of
larger magnitude than that for the manager which would take a loss, coordination is socially
optimal.
1.3.2 First Stage
At the start of the game, the revenue gains from coordinating (ri), the distribution of costs
(F (c)) and the contractability parameter (θ) are all common knowledge. The individual
realizations of the costs (ci) are, however, private information known by each manager.
Payouts will be based on the realized state of the world, which is defined by a pair of cost
draws {cA, cB}. Since each manager knows only their own cost draw, the state of the world
is not known until after organizational form is chosen.
The first stage of the game has two players (the managers), each with a strategy that maps
the cost distribution to their indicated choice for entering contract or merger bargaining
(Si : F (ci)→ {Contract,Merger}) and payouts that are dependent in part on the outcome
of the bargaining. The two managers’ indicated preferences are compared to determine
which second stage node they end up at. The baseline game grid for stage one is: If the two
managers agree on which form to bargain over, they enter that node of the overall game.
If not, both firms remain independent. The next three sections describe the second stage
nodes of the overall game.
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Figure 1.2: Baseline Game Grid
1.3.3 Independence
Under independence, the two managers make no formal agreements about coordinating. If
they both decide to do so, coordination occurs, but if either one opts out, coordination does
not occur. Thus, the two managers will coordinate if:
zA ≥ 0 and zB ≥ 0 (1.4)
As noted above, under the first best, either of zA or zB can be negative as long as the
magnitude of the positive z is larger. In this case, however, if either z is negative, the
manager in question will choose not to coordinate. This means that for certain values of the
parameters, coordination will be first best, but fail to occur.
The reverse is not true, since any case where coordination is not first best necessarily involves
one or both z values being negative, which would never result in coordination given non-
integration. Thus, remaining independent can cause coordination failure to occur even when
it would be first best to coordinate, but it never causes coordination when such is not the
first best.
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1.3.4 Contract
In this case, the firms still do not merge, but the managers negotiate a contract to govern their
coordination decision. The managers bargain over shares of the profit gain from coordinating
with each other. As under independence, if both agree to coordinate under the terms of the
contract, coordination occurs. Otherwise, coordination fails and gains are zero.5
The contractability parameter (θ ∈ (0, 1)) now becomes important, since the profit sharing
agreement can only take into account the contractible profits, The private costs of each
manager will still be felt if coordination occurs.
The contractible profits for each manager would be:
zθi = ri + θci (1.5)
The managers then bargain over a share of joint contractible profits (γ):
max
γ∈[0,1]
(
N∑
s=1
ps(UAs − dAs)
)(
N∑
s=1
ps(UBs − dBs)
)
(1.6)
s.t. constraint that both sums are positive 6
• UAs =

γ(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cA if UAs ≥ 0 & UBs ≥ 0
0 otherwise
5Another departure from Hart and Holmstrom is the use of profit shares to motivate coordination rather
than imposing a shading cost. This is done for two reasons. First, shading costs would cause the independent
case to be strictly dominant over the other organizational forms and second, having deadweight losses from
coordination failure is not essential to the results that follow.
6Any value of γ that created a negative expected surplus would not be accepted by that manager. Without
this constraint two negative sums could create a corner solution. Given the fact that private costs (1− θ)ci
are negative for any θ 6= 1, a γ value of zero or one would always be worse than independence for one of the
two managers. Corner solutions are thus not incentive compatible.
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• UBs =

(1− γ)(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cB if UAs ≥ 0 & UBs ≥ 0
0 otherwise
• dAs = Payout to A in state s under Independence
• dBs = Payout to B in state s under Independence
• γ is the share of joint contractible profits directed to manager A
• N is the number of possible states
• ps is the probability of state s occurring
If either manager determines that their expected payout is higher under independence, then
bargaining will fail and independence will result. The above bargaining problem is a gen-
eralization of Nash bargaining, where the solution is as if a neutral third party proposed
a profit share based only on the common knowledge available to both managers. An alter-
native interpretation is that the two managers bargain without revealing any information
about their costs other than what has already been communicated by their play in stage one.
If a manager did reveal such information, it would only strengthen the bargaining position
of the other manager by giving them asymmetric information. A more detailed model of the
bargaining process is avoided since the complexities of contract bargaining are not the focus
of this paper.
The existence of a contract increases the number of cases where coordination occurs. As
θ increases, coordination is more likely to occur since the private costs of each manager
are less likely to have greater magnitude than their profit share. On the other hand, over-
coordination will still be avoided since both managers retain the power to veto coordination
if their payout would turn out to be negative. The contract case collapses to the first best
at θ = 1. At this value of θ, the surplus of both managers will be positive whenever coor-
dination is first best, and for no other cases. Thus, a contract where θ = 1 would perfectly
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resolve the coordination problem.
1.3.5 Merger
In this case, the firms combine into a single firm and create a headquarters which makes
the decision whether to coordinate. In this scenario, headquarters makes the coordination
decision based on joint contractible profits (refer to the definition in the previous subsection).
If private costs are sufficiently high, this can result in negative payouts to both managers.
Headquarters will compel coordination if:
zθA + zθB ≥ 0 (1.7)
This results in a payout to manager A of φ(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cA and a payout to manager
B of (1−φ)(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cB where φ is a bargained profit share. Due to the fact that
costs (c) are negative, it is always true that:
zθA + zθB ≥ zA + zB (1.8)
which means that a merged firm will always coordinate when that outcome is first best.
Profit shares (φ) are determined via:
max
φ∈[0,1]
(
N∑
s=1
ps(UAs − dAs)
)(
N∑
s=1
ps(UBs − dBs)
)
(1.9)
s.t. constraint that both sums are positive
• UAs =

φ(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cA if zθA + zθB ≥ 0
0 otherwise
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• UBs =

(1− φ)(zθA + zθB) + (1− θ)cB if zθA + zθB ≥ 0
0 otherwise
• dAs = Payout to A in state s under Independence
• dBs = Payout to B in state s under Independence
• φ is share of contractible profits paid to manager A
• N is the number of possible states
• ps is the probability of state s occurring
As with contract bargaining, this is a generalized Nash solution that uses the common
knowledge available to both managers. The only significant difference between contracts and
mergers in this model is the decision rule used to determine whether coordination occurs.
This ensures that any differences in outcomes are driven by differences in the way in which
the two organizational types make decisions and not by differences in the payout structure.
Note that since headquarters is only concerned about costs that are contractible, it will
sometimes choose coordination when it is not first best to do so (over-coordination). The
fact that mergers remove under-coordination only to cause over-coordination, creates trade
offs between the organizational forms.
A key assumption above is that headquarters does not receive any of the profits resulting
from coordination. If headquarters receives a fixed salary regardless of their decision, or if
headquarters is simply a name for the joint decision making process of the former managers,
then the above payouts would be correct. If we consider headquarters to be a separate agent
that also receives some share of the profits, both the decision inequality and the payouts
would have to be changed to reflect compensation to headquarters when coordination failed.
However, since paying headquarters would reduce payouts to the managers, the case where
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headquarters does not receive any of the gain from coordinating represents a best case merger
scenario, which would be most likely to be chosen by the managers and most likely to result
in positive payouts.
1.3.6 Solution Concept
Each manager is seeking to maximize their utility. By backward induction, they determine
expected payouts from each decision rule given the expected bargaining outcome, and then
determine the choice in stage one that would get them to the desired bargaining game.
Before drawing their costs (ci), each manager determines when they will submit contract or
merger bargaining depending on the realization of their costs. The obvious strategy type
is a cutoff strategy where for low cost draws they submit contract or merger and for high
cost draws they submit the opposite form. For purposes of clear description, I will for the
remainder of this paper define manager B as being willing to coordinate regardless of their
cost draw, while manager A is sometimes willing and sometimes not. Put another way,
the revenue gain for B (rB) is larger in magnitude than their highest possible cost. I will
sometimes refer to manager B as the enthusiastic manager, and manager A as the reluctant
manager, reflecting their relative attitudes toward coordination.
In order to properly calculate the bargaining games, the managers will need to be aware of
how the set of possible states has shrunk given the indicated bargaining preference of the
other manager. This would allow them in turn to calculate expectations in the first stage
and develop a strategy. There are two ways in which this can be achieved, either of which
are sufficient. We can either assume equilibrium knowledge on the part of both managers or
have the managers disclose their strategy at the end of stage one. Either of these will result
in the two managers being able to agree on which states are still possible to arrive at when
they enter bargaining.
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Figure 1.3: Cutoff Strategy Comparisons
For the baseline case, whenever the two managers submit different choices for which bar-
gaining game to enter they simply remain independent. In figure 1.3 the various strategy
combinations are depicted. Note that the Nash equilibria involve the two managers playing
the opposite cutoff strategies (e.g. Contract corresponds to low costs for one firm and high
costs for the other). Negative payouts can occur if a merger occurs when both managers
have a high cost draw. The negative payouts are more likely for the reluctant manager
(A) than for the other, which makes Nash equilibrium one more plausible to arrive at than
equilibrium two (since the payouts for A are always higher). In the simulation results both
equilibria are calculated, although equilibrium one weakly Pareto dominates the other. As
with any cutoff strategy, the two managers will choose a cutoff such that the expected value
on either side of the cutoff is equal (or as close to equal as possible when using a discrete
cost space as used in the simulation results). Based on the chosen strategies, the range of
possible costs is narrowed to one of the four quadrants as shown in figure 1.3. This means
that the bargaining games will only cover a subset of the overall cost space.
One might consider an equilibrium strategy could be obtained with a more complex map-
ping than a cutoff. However, since expected payouts in all organizational forms are weakly
monotonically increasing as ci decreases, this is highly unlikely. Even if there were multiple
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Figure 1.4: Contract Convention
regions where a manager chose merger, the expected cost when choosing merger would still
have to be higher or lower than the expected cost when choosing contract, or otherwise their
choice in stage one would have no effect on the bargaining. However, the fact that cutoff
strategies do result in equilibria is sufficient to proceed.
1.3.7 Alternative Rules for First Stage
Per figure 1.2, when the two managers disagree on which type of bargaining game to enter,
they remain independent. But one can easily imagine a legal or cultural environment where
either contracts or mergers are the conventional means of solving a coordination problem.
As such, in the results that follow, I will also consider both a contract convention (see figure
1.4) and a merger convention (figure 1.5). With a contract convention, the two managers
enter merger bargaining if they both indicate as such, and they end up in contract bargaining
otherwise. Note that this removes the lower path from figure 1.1. Independence only occurs
in the case of failed bargaining. With a merger convention, the two managers enter contract
bargaining if they both indicate as such, and they end up in merger bargaining otherwise.
As with the other convention, this removes the lower path from figure 1.1.
Once implemented, these conventions alter the outcomes in the Nash equilibria. Note that
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Figure 1.6: NE1 under the Conventions
in the case where both managers have high costs, bargaining is very likely to break down
and result in independence (and thus non-coordination).
Another possible option is to ban either contracts or mergers, essentially eliminating the first
stage of the game and sending the managers directly into bargaining for whichever organi-
zational form remains. In this case, the bargaining will take place over the entire cost space
since they no longer gain information from seeing each others’ bargaining choices.
This results in five different versions of the game each reflecting a different possible institu-
tional environment. The contract convention and merger ban environments would resemble
a networked economy with lots of small firms collaborating with each other, while the merger
convention and contract ban environments would resemble the more typical industrial econ-
omy with large firms performing a combination of tasks. The baseline case can be thought
to resemble developing economies where the rules for solving coordination problems are not
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yet well defined.
1.3.8 Analytic Difficulties
As will be seen in the results that follow, an environment that favors contract will be closer to
the first best than one that favors mergers and both will better than having no convention at
all. To make the effects more clear, the organizational choice game needs to be solved. Due
to the multiple cases where payouts are conditional, the model is not congenial to analytic
results and thus investigating the model via simulation yields is more fruitful. The next
section will describe simulation output for this game.
To understand why clean analytic results are difficult to obtain, consider a case where the
cost distribution consists of only two values (high and low). In this case, if manager A adopts
a strategy that chooses merger bargaining under one value and contract bargaining under
the other, then their choice of bargaining would give manager B complete information. If,
at the same time, manager B chose the same bargaining option under both values, they
would now have a information advantage which they could exploit. Manager A would be
better off choosing the same bargaining option regardless of their cost draw. Thus, the state
space must be sufficiently large such that both managers can adopt a cutoff strategy without
giving the other manager knowledge of the exact state of the world.
Using a simulation with a large state space will produce a mixture of organizational forms
depending on the parameter values and the specific cost draws. If the state space is small
enough, the first stage of the game essentially vanishes. Given that the primary research
question concerns how managers choose between organizational firms, the state space needs
to be large enough for more than one organizational form to be possible. Using simulations,
we can describe the model with the share of random draws that achieve a particular outcome,
and comparisons can be made in terms of particular organizational forms being more or less
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likely.
1.4 Simulation of Organizational Choice
To demonstrate the range of coordination outcomes, we will arrange the simulation to create
a wide range of cost draws that result in potential coordination failure. Draw each manager’s
cost of coordinating c from a discrete uniform U(0, 1) with number of increments n. Set the
revenue gains from coordination to rB = 1 and rA = 2 −
√
3, meaning that B will always
be enthusiastic about coordinating and A will frequently be reluctant. The latter revenue
amount is chosen to make the proportion of draws where coordination is obviously good
for both managers equal to the number of draws where coordination is not first best. The
remaining ∼ 44% of draws are cases where A is reluctant but coordination is first best. See
the appendix for a robustness check using alternate revenue amounts.
Below is the output from simulations covering the full range of the contractability parameter
(θ) from 0− 1 using m even increments. The results below used n = 100 for the cost space
and m = 50 increments for θ. For each θ value, both managers determine an optimal cutoff
for both Nash equilibria, then n draws from the cost distribution are made for each manager.
For efficiency, the optimal cutoff is determined by a type of hill-climbing algorithm where
cutoffs are alternately adjusted until the jointly optimal cutoffs are located. For each pair
of draws from the cost distribution the cutoff strategy for each manager is implemented and
they enter the appropriate bargaining game (where applicable). Outcomes are recorded and
the output below reflects the proportion of draws where particular outcomes occurred.
24
Figure 1.7: Baseline - No Convention
1.4.1 Simulation Results
For all of the results diagrams, the horizontal axis is the value of the contractability parameter
(θ) and the vertical axis is the share of draws resulting in the indicated outcome. First,
we use a baseline case where no conventional organizational form is imposed. Due to the
two quadrants that result in the organizational form being independence, outcomes do not
achieve the first best in all cases, even when θ = 1. We can also see that equilibrium two is
always further from the first best outcome than equilibrium one (meaning we should expect
manager A to favor mergers when their costs are low).
Note that given the form of the payouts, since equilibrium one is never further from the first
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Figure 1.8: Contract Convention
best than equilibrium two, that the sum of the payouts are also always at least as good.
Thus, equilibrium one is weakly Pareto dominant and this gives us good reason to focus on
this equilibrium for analysis. The equilibrium where manager A chooses merger bargaining
when their costs are low, will be superior in all of the cases that follow as well. When we
set contracts to be the conventional form of bargaining, the outcomes improve considerably.
Most importantly, the share of draws resulting in a first best outcome steadily increases
and equals one when θ = 1. Note that until θ is high, merger bargaining breaks down and
independence occurs when both managers indicate merger. In this environment, a successful
merger requires that both manager’s costs be mostly visible and describable to the other (θ is
high). Mergers that cause over-coordination never occur. As always, equilibrium one yields
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Figure 1.9: Merger Convention
better outcomes than equilibrium two. With a merger convention, outcomes are also better
than with no convention. Until θ is sufficiently high, at least some amount of the merger
negotiations will break down and result in independence. Contracts, on the other hand,
will successfully be created. In this environment, under-coordination is far less common,
but instead there is a large amount of over-coordination. In an environment where mergers
cannot occur, outcomes are fairly similar to the contract default. However, the discussion
of figure 1.12 below will show that this environment is not quite as likely to achieve the
first best as the contract convention. If contracts cannot occur, the outcomes are similar to
the merger convention, with the difference being that under-coordination never occurs and
over-coordination is maximized. If we compare all of the various possible rules environments,
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Figure 1.10: Ban on Mergers
Figure 1.11: Ban on Contracts
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Figure 1.12: Rules Comparisons
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we can rank their likelihood of achieving the first best outcome as follows:
1. Contract Convention
2. Merger Ban
3. Merger Convention or Contract Ban (no discernible difference)
4. No Convention (baseline)
Of course the merger and contract ban environments are not particularly reasonable models
for any actual institutional framework in the real world. They are included here primarily
for illustrative purposes.
1.4.2 Discussion of Results
Perhaps the most important result of the simulations is that the worst outcomes result when
there is not a conventional organizational form. Having any kind of conventional mechanism
for solving coordination problems between firms is better than having none at all. There are
some potential implications here for development economics. A developing country might
be inclined to spend time and effort finding a “best” model for future growth. But, with
regard to organizational concerns, this hesitation would appear to be quite costly. Industries
with very high contractability (i.e. very visible operations and easily quantifiable costs) will
achieve notably better outcomes with either convention. When one considers that high θ
is more likely to be found in industries where materials and capital costs dominate (rather
than labor and administrative costs), a lack of an organizational convention might have a
disproportionate impact on manufacturing versus service industries, making such an envi-
ronment particularly damaging for developing economies.
The other main result is that the optimal institutional environment overall is one that favors
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contracts between firms rather than mergers. Most of the developed world currently seems
to have a merger convention environment and much of the industrial organization literature
takes for granted the optimality of this approach. Local anomalies, like the northern Ital-
ian industrial model mentioned in the introduction, challenge this assumption. The model
in this paper suggests that the success of this networked business environment may reflect
genuine economic advantages rather than some localized special circumstances.
There are however some objections one might make to a contract convention being the
optimal organizational environment. First, is that coordination problems governing comple-
mentary goods may not be the only problem that organizations solve. Mergers may be a
more effective means of managing multiple production centers for the same good. Second,
for very high θ values the gap between a merger convention and a contract convention is not
very large, and the upheaval from transitioning from one convention to another may not be
worth the gain. Finally, the model above assumes that an organizational form imposes no
unique costs of its own. One could object that contracts impose additional implementation
costs that are greater than those present in a merger. On the other hand, recall that under a
merger we have assumed that headquarters does not receive a share of the profits, and that
if it did this would make mergers less attractive for the managers. Nonetheless, whether
there are systematic differences in the cost of operating in different organizational forms is
beyond the scope of this paper.
The last potential objection to the results concerns whether the results are sensitive to dif-
ferent parameter values. The particular revenue values used above were chosen for clarity of
presentation, but the reader can refer to the appendix for results using alternative revenue
amounts. The main conclusions still hold – that a convention is preferable, and that the
contract convention is closest to the first best.
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1.4.3 Asymmetric Private Costs
Up to this point I have assumed that the proportion of the managers’ costs that is contractible
is the same for both managers. This assumption can be relaxed to consider the case where the
two managers have different levels of private costs (i.e. different θ values). We might expect
this to happen when the products of the two firms have very different production processes.
(An example might be smart phones and software applications for use on phones.) In such a
scenario, we should expect asymmetric contractability to improve outcomes relative to both
managers having the lower θ value, but reduce them relative to both managers having the
higher θ value. Giving the lower θ value to the reluctant manager (A) should produce results
further from the first best than if manager B has the lower θ value.
First consider the case where θB = 0.5 ∗ θA, meaning that manager B will always have
greater private costs than manager A. The results here are very similar to what occurs
where both managers have the higher θ value. Under a contract convention, the results are
closer to the first best than if both managers had the lower θ value, but not as good as if
they both had the higher value. Specifically, using results from figures 1.8, 1.13 and 1.16,
the percentage of draws that achieve the first best when θA = 1 & θB = 0.5 is 97% and
the percent first best when θA = 0.5 & θB = 1 is 95%. When θA = θB = 1 the percent
first best is 100%, and when θA = θB = 0.5 the percent first best is 87%. Note that raising
the reluctant manager’s contractability (θA) is more effective at improving outcomes when
using a contract convention. Under a merger convention, the results are also closer to the
first best than if both managers had the lower θ value, but not as good as if they both had
the higher value. Specifically, using results from figures 1.9, 1.14 and 1.17, the percentage
of draws that achieve the first best when θA = 1 & θB = 0.5 is 81% and the percent first
best when θA = 0.5 & θB = 1 is 77%. When θA = θB = 1 the percent first best is 100%,
and when θA = θB = 0.5 the percent first best is 72%. Note that raising the enthusiastic
manager’s contractability (θB) is more effective at improving outcomes when using a merger
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Figure 1.13: Baseline where B has more private costs
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Figure 1.14: Contract Convention, B has more private costs
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Figure 1.15: Merger Convention, B has more private costs
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Figure 1.16: Baseline where A has more private costs
convention.
Now consider the case where θA = 0.5∗θB, meaning that manager A will always have greater
private costs than manager B. As the above figures indicate, outcomes are improved by
an increase in θ for only one firm. The effect is minimal under the baseline case. Under
a contract convention an increase in the reluctant manager’s contractability (θA) improves
outcomes more than a comparable increase in enthusiastic manager’s contractability (θB)
would. The reverse is true under a merger convention.
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Figure 1.17: Contract Convention, A has more private costs
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Figure 1.18: Merger Convention, A has more private costs
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1.5 Conclusion
I draw three main conclusions from the analysis. First, that setting a convention that bi-
ases managers toward contracts or mergers improves outcomes by making independence less
likely. Second, that it is not optimal to ban contracts or mergers and mandate a particular
organizational outcome (behavior should be nudged, but not forced). Finally, a convention
that makes the contracts the standard means of solving coordination problems brings out-
comes closer to the first best than one favoring mergers.
In addition, there are some secondary results of interest. The degree of private costs ex-
perienced by the managers do not have to be symmetric, and an improvement in the con-
tractability of only one manager’s costs improves outcomes. However, it is important which
manager has the lower private costs. If the manager who is more enthusiastic about coordi-
nating has lower private costs, this improves outcomes for a merger convention rather more
than it does for a contract convention. Conversely, if the more reluctant manager has lower
private costs, this improves outcomes more for a contract convention. I also observe (see
Appendix) that a wider gap in the revenue gains between the two firms increases the benefit
of imposing a convention.
A number of extensions and concerns arise. The model here is a one-shot game, and a re-
peated game with a large population of managers could potentially yield different results.
For example, it is unclear whether in a repeated environment that mergers would be more
optimal (by providing long term certainty), or be less optimal (due to some managers get-
ting trapped in bad deals). Experimental tests are also worth exploring, especially since the
model above uses risk neutral agents and experimental subjects with some degree of risk
aversion might produce significantly different results. Lastly, any attempt to demonstrate
the theory via an econometric investigation would hinge upon finding a sufficient proxy for
the contractability parameter.
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The results are broadly consistent with the empirical literature, with a rich variety of out-
comes that replicate the typical merger friendly environment of the developed world, the
less common and less well-understood contractual environments, as well as the relative lack
of effective coordination in developing economies. On the other hand, the model does not
explain how these organizational rules get determined and further research would be needed
to address policy changes that could induce a shift from one rule set to another. Nonethe-
less, the model here should be sufficient to demonstrate that organizational form is neither
neutral nor irrelevant to economic outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Norm Enforcement in Faith
Communities
I introduce a model of religious organizations, where members of a population choose whether
to enforce material contributions to the group, and also how much to commit to those contri-
butions. Expected effort along each dimension follows a norm framework, where deviations
from the norm generate disutility. Depending on the relative strength of the norms and
the effectiveness of enforcement, the nature of the equilibrium varies. An expanded model
distinguishes doctrinal practices from material commitment to provide further insight. The
equilibrium types of the static model are shown to be steady states of a dynamic norm se-
lection process. An extension treats doctrinal norms as fixed, and provides explanations for
the formation of sects, as well as observed distinctions between new and mature religious
denominations.
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2.1 Introduction
There are a vast array of religious groups, exhibiting wide variations in size of congregation,
the requirements of membership, and the benefits enjoyed by members. Economists, and
other social scientists studying religion, have long observed a correlation between the strict-
ness of a faith group and the amount of benefits conferred. But simply having a code of
conduct does not ensure compliance, and members of a faith community exhibit diversity in
how faithful they are to the rules, whether strict or not. A substantial existing literature has
analyzed strictness as a mechanism for preventing free-riding in a club good environment.
But what is strictness? It could be described as a social distance from secular behavior, but
this only seems to be clear and useful in developed world settings where secular behavior is
the default. One could also describe strictness as the amount of time or money demanded of
members, which is convenient for analysis, but would neglect a variety of phenomena, such
as veiling or circumcision, that impose neither temporal nor pecuniary costs. The degree of
strictness might take into account the relative visibility of regulated behaviors to outsiders.
Strictness could also describe the severity of penalties for non-conformity, or the degree to
which members must share the labor of ensuring conformity.
Clearly, the concept of strictness could be divided into a great many components, many of
which could provide added insight. For this paper, I propose decomposing strictness into
several components. I refer to effort that boosts the likelihood of punishment for failing to
contribute as enforcement. All other effort provided, whether material or observant, falls
into the category of commitment. In the full model, I further subdivide material effort from
doctrinal observance, with the former still called commitment and the latter designated as
doctrine.
My analysis uses the framework of a norm utility model, where the amount of effort members
are expected to contribute to each category is a particular level called a norm. Deviation
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from these norms generates disutility in proportion to how much a member deviates from the
norm. Initially, I will take the norms as exogenous, but the dynamic treatment will explore
a process by which norms might be set. In addition to disutility from failing to follow norms,
members take disutility from the effort they individually contribute, but gain utility from a
club good that takes as its inputs all of the effort contributed by the group.
When considering how social norms are maintained, one has to first recognize that social
norms do not typically arise by consensus. Rather, the set of “proper” behaviors is often
disputed, and individuals can differ dramatically in their desire to deviate from acceptable
behavior. Some degree of non-conformity appears unavoidable. The key to maintaining a
set of norms lies in the response to those individuals who refuse to conform. At least some
non-conformists must be punished for doing so, and some members of a group must take
up the task of identifying and punishing people who disobey the norms. In other words, a
social norm must be enforced.
The need for enforcement motivates a unique aspect of the model environment – the use of
a punishment function that modifies the disutility that members experience from violating
certain norms. In the basic model, punishment affects all commitment (material or not),
while in the full model it modifies the norm disutility from failing to observe doctrine. The
degree of punishment is determined by the total enforcement effort, causing the norms to
interact with each other.
Also, since individuals vary, we must consider individual responsiveness to the demands
placed on them by a faith. Members of a congregation will be more or less sensitive to these
norms, and the distribution of norm sensitivity will in large part determine the amount of
effort within the group.
I employ the model environment to examine a number of phenomena commonly addressed
in studies of religion These include why sects break off from established religions, and why
spreading a faith to new communities can change how the faith is practiced. The model can
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also provide insight about why new religions often demand large material commitments or
punish infractions harshly, while mature faiths with wide acceptance frequently have many
members simply observing doctrine without providing any other form of effort.
2.2 Literature
The modern economics of religion literature starts with the club goods model of Iannaccone
(1992). Here religious organizations are described as providing a club good, but where
members must also pay the costs of unusual doctrinal practices. The ensures that only serious
participants belong to the faith, meaning that religious organizations’ distinctive practices
screen out free riders. This is not the first economic work on religion. As early as Azzi and
Ehrenberg (1975) there were models of consumer choice among religions. Iannaccone’s paper
is, however, the seminal paper in the club good strand of the literature.
The religious club good model is featured in many papers, and notable recent contributions
include Berman (2000) which analyzes the practices of Haredi Judaism as a generous club
good that offsets substantial compliance costs. In Chen (2010), the growth of Islam in
Indonesia in the wake of the late 1990s Asian financial crises is linked to the services provided
to members. The services provided by faith groups are often competitive with state services,
and can act as a substitute. See Hungerman (2005) for analysis of church service provision
in US context, and Iyer et al. (2014) for a look at social service provision by faiths in India.
The benefits of faith groups need not be wholly material, and can nclude a sense of access
to supernatural gains, as discussed in Iannaccone and Berman (2006).
However, other papers suggest that passive conformity and varying levels of effort play an
important role in religious movements. Examination of the middle eastern veiling movement
in Carvalho (2013) demonstrates that the spread of distinctive religious practices do not
neatly correspond to high levels of piety. See also Patel (2012) for an analysis of how the
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signaling quality of veiling has been diminished as it has become more common, which is
consistent with the dynamic version of the model where, when norms become more salient to
the population, the intensity of norms tends to fall. The level of service provided by a faith
group also need not be uniform as detailed by McBride (2007), an exploration of membership
tiers within the Mormon faith, demonstrating the importance of a distribution of religious
effort within a denomination.
The model takes as exogenous the degree to which members are more or less responsive
to religious norms, which is potentially problematic since some people actively choose their
faith affiliation, and might select in or out of a group. However, a study of the Catholic
child abuse scandal of the 2000s by Hungerman (2013) measured the degree of substitution
between faiths by using the scandal as a natural experiment. The results imply a high
degree of substitution which, at least for the larger faiths within a society, reduces concern
about self-selection. A possible contrast comes from Barros and Garoupa (2002), a theory
paper where churches choose strictness such as to attract desired types from the population,
however since the model below allows for types who exhibit no effort one could still interpret
the distribution as exogenous, if the model population is viewed not as the congregation, but
rather the local public in general. As a counterargument, Levy and Razin (2012) present a
model where faiths actively shape individual beliefs, a likely phenomenon that is neglected
in the model below.
In the sociological literature there has been substantial debate about how to classify religious
groups, particularly newer ones. The most influential view comes from Wallis (1984), where
one key aspect of a faith is whether it sees itself as apart from the world (i.e. nonbelievers)
or whether it sees itself as existing within the world. Newer religions are much more likely
to view their members as a special group set apart from the rest of society, and this can be
thought of as reflecting a larger material or doctrinal commitment. The doctrinal rigidity
section discusses possible explanations for these characteristics of new religious groups.
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The model below is a norm utility model. Such models have frequently been used in the
experimental literature to examine rule following behavior. A basic version of these models
can be found in Bicchieri (2006). Agents have utility of this form:
Ui(xi) = g(xi, x−i) − γiβi(xˆ− xi)2
Here xˆ is the norm, γi is i’s norm salience parameter, x−i is all other person’s contributions,
and βi reflects i’s beliefs about how likely others will comply with the norm. In this paper, I
will use a commonly known distribution of γ values, and use the simplification that βi = 1 for
all i. This simplification is warned against in Bicchieri’s paper, however in the setting of this
paper, it is less controversial. If we assume that the same people who respond strongly to a
religious norm also have confidence that it will be followed, then we could say that βi = f(γi)
where f(.) is an increasing function. In that case a composite parameter combining γ and
β would be mathematically indistinguishable from letting βi = 1 for all i. I contend that
confidence in the viability of a religious norm is reasonably likely to be correlated with with
how compelling that norm is to an individual. As such, this simplification is not pernicious.
From the norm literature there are a number of observations that arise in this work as well.
In Horne (2003), internalization of norms is shown to be widespread which is consistent with
any equilibrium where the norm for enforcement is low or the share of people performing such
effort is low, but Horne (2004) points out that some enforcement is nonetheless necessary.
Norms are a powerful tool for overcoming collective action problems, and per B (2007), they
can sustain cooperation even for conduct that is costly or atypical for the society at large.
Lpez-Prez (2008) details an experiment that explains some seemingly non-rational behavior
commonly discovered in experimental settings as due to norms of reciprocity that subjects
bring into the experiment with them. This attests to the powerful influence of expected
conduct on individual effort, and the experience of disutility when failing to live up to those
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expectations.
2.3 Basic Model
There is a faith community with a member population of size N . Members of the community
choose the amount of effort they wish to contribute amongst two tasks. The first task is
their commitment to the group (ci) which contributes to collective production of a club good.
The second task is enforcement (ei), which increases the chance that members who fail to
commit will be punished for doing so, and also contributes to the club good. The model is
static.
Members are expected to commit and enforce according to exogenous norms (cˆ and eˆ).
Deviation from the norm generates disutility, but members vary in their sensitivity to these
norms (γi). These non-negative norm salience values are drawn from a distribution whose
density function has domain {γ ∈ R|0 < γ <∞}.
The club good produces utility for each member according to a function g(c˜, e˜) which is
increasing and concave in the total amount of commitment effort (c˜) and non-decreasing and
non-convex in the total amount of enforcement effort (e˜), and where g(0, 0) = 0. The reader
might wonder whether enforcement effort should be omitted from the club good function.
While in many cases the benefits enjoyed by a faith group are probably separable from effort
spent enforcing doctrine, this is not always the case. For example, visible enforcement effort
could increase members’ sense of belonging, which in turn would enhance their enjoyment
of the club good. Regardless, having enforcement effort be an argument of the club good
function is the more general case.
The norm disutility when a member fails to meet their commitment to the club good is
adjusted by a punishment function p(e˜), that is increasing in total enforcement effort, and
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where p(0) = 1. The punishment function can be interpreted as the likelihood of being
caught shirking commitment, increased guilt from shirking commitment, or the severity of
punishment – or a combination of those things. The exact nature of the punishment is
abstracted in the model. It is important to note that by making p(0) = 1 we are saying
that an unenforced commitment norm will reduce to a standard norm utility model with a
club good and a single norm.1 With enforcement, the marginal cost of commitment falls,
inducing higher commitment effort.
Thus, members will choose positive commitment and enforcement levels to maximize the
following utility function:
Ui(ci, ei) = g(ci, c−i, ei, e−i) − p(ei, e−i)γi(cˆ− ci)2 − ci − γi(eˆ− ei)2 − ei (2.1)
Note that c−i is sum of all other members’ commitment effort, and similarly for e−i and
enforcement effort. This utility function measures all costs and benefits for members relative
to the typical utility they would enjoy if not a member of the faith community, and enjoying
the typical lifestyle of someone in the society at large. This baseline should not be interpreted
as a modeling assumption that the faith group exists within a secular society. The society
at large might reflect a religious perspective as well. This does mean that a religious group
modeled in one cultural context might have different parameter values when analyzed in
another context.
Maximizing an individual’s utility results in the following optimal efforts:
c∗i = max
[
cˆ − 1− gc
2p(e˜)γi
, 0
]
(2.2)
e∗i = max
[
eˆ − 1− ge
2γi
− pe
2
(cˆ− ci)2 , 0
]
(2.3)
1Note that if club good requires enforcement input, say if it were a Cobb-Douglas function, then p(0)
would result in zero club good production and thus zero utility for all members.
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Note that as the population increases, the individual contributions to the club good and
punishment function diminish. Thus, the limit case as N →∞ is:
c∗i = max
[
cˆ − 1
2p(e˜)γi
, 0
]
e∗i = max
[
eˆ − 1
2γi
, 0
]
From the above we can see that a member’s norm salience (γi) is critical to determining
whether they contribute a non-zero effort to either task. Members for whom the norms are
highly salient will produce efforts very close to the normative amounts. This also means that
there is a cutoff for both commitment and enforcement, and individuals with norm salience
below those values will contribute zero effort, but depending on the norm values and the
punishment function, one cutoff or the other could take a higher value.
Rearranging the optimal effort equations gives the cutoff conditions, where γc is the norm
salience where an individual is indifferent about contributing commitment effort, and γe is
the norm salience where an individual is indifferent about contributing enforcement effort:
γc =
1− gc
2p(e˜)cˆ
(2.4)
γe =
1− ge
2eˆ + pe cˆ2
if γe ≤ γc (2.5)
γe =
1− ge
4eˆ
+
√
p(e˜)2(1− ge)2 + 2eˆpe(1− gc)2
4p(e˜)eˆ
if γe > γc (2.6)
As population increases the enforcement cutoff is increasingly determined primarily by the
level of the enforcement norm, while the commitment cutoff is determined by the commitment
norm and the shape of the punishment function. This implies that a smaller congregation will
have a higher proportion of members participating in both commitment and enforcement.
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The total effort expended on commitment and enforcement would thus be:
c˜ =
N∑
i=1
max
[
cˆ − 1− gc
2p(e˜)γi
, 0
]
(2.7)
e˜ =
N∑
i=1
max
[
eˆ − 1− ge
2γi
− pe
2
(cˆ− ci)2 , 0
]
(2.8)
Neither of these can be evaluated without explicitly defining the norm-salience distribution,
but it will always hold that e˜ is increasing in eˆ and that c˜ is increasing in cˆ. It also clear that
a rise in the enforcement norm will always increase total commitment. However, a rise in the
commitment norm would cause enforcement to fall slightly, although this effect diminishes
as the congregation gets large.
However, as noted above, a larger congregation implies smaller pe and thus the commitment
norm will have decreasing effect on total enforcement as the congregation grows. For a given
norm-salience distribution and a sufficiently large congregation, total enforcement effort is
determined by the enforcement norm while total commitment effort is determined by the
commitment norm and the shape of the punishment function.
2.3.1 Equilibrium Types
We can now classify the possible equilibria into distinct types depending on the relative
position of the enforcement and commitment cutoffs. The simplest equilibrium is one where
γe > γ¯, which would mean that no one contributes enforcement effort and thus, per equation
(2), the model reduces to a simple norm utility model. I designate these equilibria Type
Zero. Since this is an outcome indistinguishable from a secular social club, this is not a
particularly interesting type of equilibrium for the subject under consideration. The key
result is that at least some members of the faith group must have high norm-salience in
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order for an outcome resembling a religion to occur in equilibrium.
If γe ≤ γ¯ and γe < γc, the result is a Type EC equilibrium. Members with γi ≤ γe will
provide neither enforcement nor commitment effort. Members with γe < γi ≤ γc will provide
enforcement effort but no commitment effort. Finally, members with γi > γc will provide
both. The Type EC equilibrium is distinguished by this middle category of “cheating”
enforcers, who do not contribute commitment effort. There are also two subtypes of these
equilibria. First, subtype EC(ce) where cˆ ≤ eˆ and ci ≤ ei for all members, and second,
subtype EC(ec) where cˆ > eˆ and ci > ei for members with the highest norm-sensitivity.
If γe ≤ γ¯ and γe > γc, the result is a Type CE equilibrium. Members with γi ≤ γc will neither
enforce nor commit. Members with γc < γi ≤ γe will provide commitment effort but not
enforcement. Finally, members with γi > γe will provide both. The Type CE equilibrium
is also distinguished by the members with mid-range norm-sensitivity, in this case “passive”
commitment. There are also two subtypes of Type CE equilibria. First, subtype CE(ce)
where cˆ < eˆ and ci < ei for members with high norm-sensitivity, and second, subtype CE(ec)
where cˆ ≥ eˆ and ci ≥ ei for all members.
Figure 2.1 depicts the four subtypes (neglecting the uninteresting Type Zero). Note that
the capital letters of a type designation indicate lowest to highest effort cutoffs, and the
parenthetical lower case letters indicate lowest to highest norm levels. Alternatively, the
capital letters can be read as highest to lowest share of the congregation contributing that
type of effort.
2.3.2 Discussion
As noted above, and typical for club good models, a larger congregation will have a smaller
proportion of members contributing either type of effort. Given that new religious groups
must, of necessity, start out small – this result is consistent with the known phenomena of
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new religions taking up more of their members time and resources, as well as being harsher
to those who go against doctrine.
The four equilibrium types provide broad categories of faith groups. To distinguish them,
I will describe each type using an example of a Christian denomination. Type EC(ce)
has a portion of members who enforce but do not commit, and the enforcement norm is
higher. This is the region of nondenominational evangelicals, where material and doctrinal
commitments are modest but sin and proper living are of high concern. Type EC(ec) also
has members who enforce but do not commit, but here the commitment norm is higher.
This resembles the Mormons, where material and doctrinal commitments are high for those
who opt into them (high salience members). Type CE(ce) includes members who commit
but do not engage in enforcement, and the enforcement norm is higher. This is the region of
Pentecostals, particularly Assemblies of God, which exhibit high rates of giving, distinctive
worship practices but enforcement effort is more concentrated in clergy and key members
of a congregation. Finally, type CE(ec) also has members who commit but do not enforce,
but the commitment norm is higher. This resembles Catholic churches, where there are
many unique doctrinal practices and substantial charities, but enforcement is of relatively
low priority.
2.4 Full Model
A reasonable criticism of the basic model is that it conflates members’ lack of material
commitment (time and money) with failure to observe the unique practices (dress, diet,
conduct, etc.) of a particular faith. The basic model treats these two types of effort as having
equal impact on the benefits, and also being equally responsive to punishment or admonition
when effort is low. As a refinement, let us call these unique practices the doctrine of a faith
group, with a distinct doctrine norm (dˆ) and individual doctrinal effort di. In addition let
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the punishment function only modify the norm disutility of doctrine. The individual utility
function becomes:
Ui(ci, di, ei) = g(ci, c−i, di, d−i, ei, e−i) − γi(cˆ− ci)2 − ci − p(ei, e−i)γi(dˆ− di)2 − di
− γi(eˆ − ei)2 − ei (2.9)
Maximizing an individual’s utility results in the following optimal efforts:
c∗i = max
[
cˆ − 1− gc
2γi
, 0
]
(2.10)
d∗i = max
[
dˆ − 1− gd
2p(e˜)γi
, 0
]
(2.11)
e∗i = max
[
eˆ − 1− ge
2γi
− pe(dˆ− di)
2
2
, 0
]
(2.12)
As with the basic model, the optimal efforts imply cutoff conditions defining the minimum
norm sensitivity needed for an individual to contribute that type of effort. These cutoffs are:
γc =
1− gc
2cˆ
(2.13)
γd =
1− gd
2p(e˜)dˆ
(2.14)
γe =
1− ge
2eˆ + pe dˆ2
if γe ≤ γd (2.15)
γe =
1− ge
4eˆ
+
√
p(e˜)2(1− ge)2 − 2eˆpe(1− gd)2
4p(e˜)eˆ
if γe > γd (2.16)
For purposes of characterizing equilibrium types it is useful to consider a limit case where
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N → ∞, meaning that the congregation is sufficiently large that individual efforts do not
notably change the output of the club good or the value of the punishment function. This
simplifies the cutoff points to:
γc =
1
2cˆ
γd =
1
2p(e˜)dˆ
γe =
1
2eˆ
It is also important to note that if one were to assume a club good function where doctrinal
effort or enforcement, or both, have no effect, then simpler cutoff values for doctrine and/or
enforcement would result even without the limit case assumption.
As in the basic model, total effort in any category is increasing in the corresponding norm
(meaning c˜ is increasing in cˆ, etc.), and an increase in the enforcement norm will also drive
up doctrinal effort via increased punishment. However, an increase in the doctrinal norm
will reduce enforcement effort, with this effect diminishing as congregation size grows.
2.4.1 Equilibrium Types
I will again use a notation for categorizing equilibrium types of the form CDE(cde), where
the capital letters are lowest to highest effort cutoffs and the lower case letters are lowest
to highest norm value. Recall that the capital letters can also be read as highest to lowest
share of the membership contributing a particular type of effort. This would seem to result
in 36 different equilibrium types where at least some members of the congregation contribute
all three types of effort, and at least some members contribute no effort. However, many of
these equilibrium types can be ruled out.
There are also numerous cases where due to a very high minimum norm salience or very
low maximum norm salience where the above types would be truncated in some way. For
several reasons, I will focus on the equilibrium types with a wide range of norm salience.
First, since I am using the limit case to simplify the cutoff criteria, this would also mean
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that the population would encompass the entire domain of the norm salience distribution (all
positive finite numbers), which would rule out truncated versions of the equilibrium types.
Second, equilibria where one of the three types of effort doesn’t exist do not resemble the
organizations being analyzed. A faith group with no doctrinal practices, or no enforcement
of them, or no material commitments (not even worship time) is no faith at all. Finally, as
pointed out in McBride (2015), even very strict faiths have at least some free riders, thus we
can neglect cases that lack them.
By comparing the cutoff expressions and performing proofs by contradiction, many of the
combinations of cutoffs and norm rankings cannot actually occur. After removing the impos-
sible types, we are left with only 12 relevant equilibrium types. Three of these2 I will call a
marginal commitment equilibrium, meaning that the member contributing marginal effort is
adding to material commitments. Six of these3 I designate as marginal doctrine equilibrium
types. The last three4 are marginal enforcement types. In the extensions in later sections,
we will be able to narrow our focus even further.
Figure 2.2 depicts the marginal enforcement and marginal commitment equilibrium types,
and Figure 2.3 depicts the marginal doctrine equilibrium types:
2These are CDE(dec), CDE(edc), and CED(dec), found in the right column of Fig. 2
3These are DCE(ecd), DCE(edc), DCE(dec), DEC(ced), DEC(cde), and DEC(dce), found in Fig. 3
4These are ECD(dec), EDC(cde), and EDC(dce), found in the left column of Fig. 2
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Figure 2.2: Full Model: E- and C- Equilibrium Types
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If the number of types seems extravagant, it may help the reader to notice that half of
the equilibrium types involve enforcement being consistently higher than commitment (left
columns), and the other half feature the reverse (right columns). The remaining variation
has to do with whether and how doctrinal effort intersects the other two response functions.
2.5 Dynamic Endogenous Norms
Per above, the full model with exogenous norms yields a set of static equilibrium types. But
religious norms are not truly exogenous, and we would expect the norms within a group to
adjust over time to their collective desires, meaning that the distribution of norm salience
types would ultimately shape the norms. To model this in the most straightforward fashion,
assume an infinite horizon, discrete time setting with no discounting, and let the norms
adjust via laws of motion of the following type:
cˆt+1 =
N∑
i=1
(cˆi − cˆt)c∗i,t
N∑
i=1
c∗i,t
+ cˆt (2.17)
In the above equation, cˆt and cˆt+1 are the current period and next period norm values,
respectively. Also, cˆi is the preferred norm value of individual i and c
∗
i,t is the current effort
of individual i toward that type of activity. A similar law of motion would exist for dˆt+1 and
eˆt+1. An individual’s preferred norm values are those which would maximize their utility.
The implied mechanism is that the people who put out effort of a particular type have
influence on that norm, to the degree of their current contribution. If the sum in the
numerator of the first term is positive, this means that contributors prefer a higher norm
and the norm will rise. The reverse occurs if the sum is negative. Obviously, this abstracts
from any organizational constraints that might slow down the process of norm adjustment
59
or make certain individuals have more or less weight than their contributions would imply.
To clarify the relationship between norm preference and norm salience, I will again use
the simplification of a “large” congregation, and have agents be fully aware of each others’
reaction functions. Thus, to obtain preferred norms an individual would maximize their
utility taking into account all members responses to the norms. A member whose maximizing
norms would cause them to contribute to all three inputs would solve:
Ui(cˆi, dˆi, eˆi) = g(c˜, d˜, e˜) +
1
2γi
+
1
4p(e˜)γi
− cˆ − dˆ − eˆ (2.18)
Recall that tildes represent total effort of that type, and note that the norm disutility terms
collapse into constants that are a function of the individuals norm salience. Solving for the
optimal norms yields:
gcˆ = 1 gdˆ = 1 geˆ = 1
This means that for individuals who do not intend to free ride on any input, their preferred
norms are such that the marginal benefit of increasing the norm will equal their marginal
cost of effort. However, not all individuals will prefer norms such that they contribute to all
club good inputs. To illustrate, a member whose maximizing norms would cause them to
free ride on all inputs would solve:
Ui(cˆi, dˆi, eˆi) = g(c˜, d˜, e˜) − γicˆ2 − p(e˜)γidˆ2 − γieˆ2 (2.19)
gcˆ = 2γicˆi gdˆ = 2p(e˜)γidˆi geˆ = 2γieˆi
In the limit case, the terms do not interact with each other and thus intermediate cases where
an individual free rides on one input but not others would use the free rider condition for
that input, and the contributor conditions for the others. As such, it is clear that preferred
norms go to infinity as γ approaches zero, and fall as γ increases, but once the marginal
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benefit equals the cost of effort, the preferred norm will be flat for all γ above that point.
For example:
Thus, there will exist an equilibrium path leading to a unique steady state which will cor-
respond to one of the static equilibrium types, and where the norm values will be such that
the marginal benefit from increasing the norm equals the marginal cost of effort for all those
contributing. For any norm that is below the steady state value, all contributions will come
from individuals who desire the norm to be higher5, causing it to move upwards. For any
norm that is above the steady state value, all contributions will come from individuals who
desire the norm to be lower, causing it to move downwards.
5Note that at the steady state value, the marginal contributor is the member whose desired norm is the
same whether assuming they contribute or not. Thus a norm level lower than that will necessarily involve
the marginal contributor having a higher norm salience, and all contributors desiring the steady state norm
value (the flat portion of the curve).
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2.6 Doctrinal Rigidity
It may seem unrealistic to allow the doctrinal norm to adjust as freely as the commitment
and enforcement norms. While doctrinal practices do change, expectations about time and
money contributed, or the degree to which doctrinal offenses are condemned should reason-
ably adjust much faster. To simulate this in a simple fashion, assume the dynamic model is
at a steady state and that the doctrinal norm is fixed in the short run. Applying a permanent
shock to the distribution of norm salience would place the model on a path to a new steady
state where dˆ remained the same, but cˆ and eˆ would change.
If the distributional shock causes average norm salience to fall, this means that contributions
would fall for all inputs. Since the club good function is concave in its inputs, this means the
marginal benefit of higher norms will rise, causing the norm values to rise to reduce marginal
benefit back to marginal cost. But since dˆ is fixed, only the commitment and enforcement
norms will rise. If the shock is large enough, the new steady state may have a different
equilibrium type. The reverse process would occur for a rise in average norm salience.
If we leave the doctrinal norm fixed and reduce average norm salience, eventually only six of
the equilibrium types will be viable steady states. Specifically, these are the six types where
the doctrinal norm is the lowest norm (top two rows of Fig. 2.2, and top row of Fig. 2.3).
Because the commitment and enforcement norms both move up (and to the same degree),
the ranking of those norms will remain consistent. Thus, if a faith group starts in an equi-
librium in one of the left columns of Fig. 2.2 or Fig. 2,3, the new steady state will also be
in the left column of those two figures, and vice versa. Which of these types result is going
to be determined by the strength of the punishment function. For a very strong punishment
function, expect the top row of Fig. 2.3. For a weak punishment function, expect the top
row of Fig. 2.2.
If we instead increase norm salience, eventually only two of the types will be viable, specifi-
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cally DEC(ced) and DCE(ecd) (the bottom row of Fig. 2.3). These two equilibrium types
are characterized by doctrinal observance being far more likely, and more substantial than
either material commitment or enforcement. Since this results from very high norm salience,
we can identify these equilibrium types as the pattern of mature faiths with high cultural
acceptance.
To clarify, movement across the columns is only possible if changes are made to the club
good function, altering the relative productivity of commitment versus enforcement. Move-
ment within the columns of figures 2.2 and 2.3 can occur due to changes in average norm
salience, or from changing the effectiveness of the punishment function.
2.6.1 Discussion
Using the above observations about how doctrinal rigidity interacts with changes in norm
sensitivity, we can examine a number of examples that illustrate the theory. Before discussing
specific examples, it is worth examining the secularization thesis, and why the advance of
modernity has not uniformly diminished the role of religion in public life. If we describe
secularization as a general decline in norm salience for all faiths, and assume relatively rigid
doctrines, the response will be a rise in commitment and enforcement effort. In other words,
the religious groups that survive secularization pressure will expect more material contribu-
tions from their members and expend more effort policing members’ behavior. For example,
in the United States, the rise of evangelical Christianity in the wake of the Sexual Revolution
is thus not paradoxical at all – it is predicted by the theory.
The fact that high commitment and enforcement norms are associated with low norm salience
has implications for new religious movements (NRMs). First, it explains why many NRMs
treat those who violate their doctrines very harshly, and also the common phenomenon of
communal living arrangements amongst these groups. Second, when such groups mature
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and become more accepted, the earlier strict practices begin to decline. The history of the
Methodists provides a useful example. Originally a reform movement within the Anglican
faith, Methodists broke away in the late 18th century6 Early Methodists promoted plain
dress, periodic fasting, and abstinence from alcohol and gambling. By the mid-19th century,
Methodism was the largest Christian denomination in the United States and after the Civil
War it was the denomination most associated with the Temperance movement. Over the
course of the 20th century, however, the strict rules were relaxed in most congregations. For
example, the current United Methodist Church stance on alcohol is merely to discourage it
– restrained consumption is acceptable.
We can also use the interaction between norm salience and doctrinal rigidity to explain the
formation of sects. Contrast the history of the Unification Church of Sun Myung Moon with
the history of Soka Gakkai Buddhism. As described below, these two faiths emerged contem-
poraneously in northeastern Asian countries and attempted to expand into North America
at a similar time as well. However, the Unification Church, ironically given its name, has
splintered into competing sects, while Soka Gakkai has remained unified. This cannot be
explained as being due to the Unification Church being larger, since Soka Gakkai has more
members (12 million) than all variations of the Unification Church (3 million) combined7.
The difference in outcomes lies in a doctrinal reform that Soka Gakkai undertook during its
overseas expansion.
The Unification Church, or more formally, the “Holy Spiritual Association for Unification
of World Christianity”, started in mid-20th century Korea. The faith had a charismatic
founder, Sun Myung Moon (1920-2012), who was a staunch anti-Communist, perhaps in
part due to his imprisonment by the North Korean regime in the late 1940s. Before and
during the Korean War, Moon had been a Presbyterian, but post-war he founded the Unifi-
6This is partly due to Methodism taking hold in the American colonies. In England, Methodism largely
existed as an upgrade or add-on to Anglican worship. But in the American context, the faith became distinct
since many experienced no other way to be Anglican other than the strict manner preferred by Methodists.
7Both of these numbers are from these faiths’ own figures, and are likely inflated. Nonetheless, the relative
size is clear.
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cation Church. By 1970, the faith began to expand outside of South Korea. In the United
States, the Unification Church was plagued by scandals involving right wing political con-
nections, accused of brainwashing members and was often labeled a cult. Several sects have
formed in the wake of Moon’s death, with the two most prominent being associated with
Moon’s widow Hak Ja Han, focused in Korea, and another with one of Moon’s sons, Hyung
Jin Moon, focused in the United States. In the context of the model, sect formation came
about as a result of the faith experiencing lower norm salience in the Western world, and
these congregations evolved into a different equilibrium type.
Soka Gakkai, Japanese for “Value Creation Society”, is a variation of Nichiren Buddhism,
started in 1930s Japan. Soka Gakkai had a pair of charismatic founders, Tsunesaburo
Makiguchi and Josei Toda, both of whom were imprisoned by Imperial Japan for criticizing
State Shinto. Makiguchi died in prison, and Toda continued the movement and oversaw its
rapid growth post-war. In the 1970s, the faith began expanding overseas, but implemented
a series of doctrinal reforms paring the faith down to key essentials, and designating many
practices optional. See Dawson (2001) for more detail. Soka Gakkai has spread to more than
a hundred countries, and has yet to experience a break-away sect. Because the doctrinal
reforms did not end any practices, just rendered them optional, it meant that observing the
faith would be less burdensome outside of a Japanese context. The drop in norm salience
that overseas congregations would face was thus reduced, allowing them to remain in the
same equilibrium type in the new cultural context. Thus, the newer overseas temples would
still have the same relative emphases on commitment, enforcement and doctrine as the older
temples in Japan – inhibiting sect formation.
As noted above, the equilibrium types where the commitment norm exceeds the enforcement
norm can only shift into the reverse scenario due to a change in the club good function that
alters the relative importance of these two inputs. While outside the scope of the model,
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faith groups may have some control over this weighting8. If such changes are difficult or
uncommon, then once we identify a faith group as having high relative commitment or high
relative enforcement, its equilibrium type is then a matter of the norm salience distribution
it faces, and relative effectiveness of punishment.
Specifically, for a high relative enforcement club good, high norm salience will push a faith to-
ward type DEC(ced), while low norm salience with weak punishment yields type ECD(dce)
and low norm salience with strong punishment yields type DEC(dce). For a high relative
commitment club good, high norm salience will push a faith toward type DCE(ecd), while
low norm salience with weak punishment yields type CED(dec) and low norm salience with
strong punishment yields type DCE(dec).
For an example of the last type, the Amish offset substantial doctrinal restrictions on dress
and technology by use of intentional communities with high material commitment require-
ments. Enforcement is strong, but young people are allowed a lot of leeway (the rite of
passage called Rumspringa) and anyone can return to the faith after a period of lax be-
havior. Technological restrictions make these material contributions essential to the faith
remaining viable, especially since children born into the faith who encounter the wider world
would have decreasing norm salience as time goes on. The DCE(dec) type is a basin among
the equilibrium types that will occur when low norm salience persists, and the punishment
function is very effective.
A notable contrast can be found among Jehovah’s Witnesses, who also encourage a high de-
gree of material commitment and enforcement. There are an estimated 20 million Witnesses
worldwide, but only about 8 million are considered “publishers” – i.e. people engaged in
preaching to non-members (a time-based mode of commitment). More than this, there are
substantial internal mechanisms for punishment, including several tiers of shunning up to,
8Mathematically, the club good function could be Cobb-Douglas and the exponent parameters would be
adjustable. However, this would seem to entail a major change in community organization, likely to be even
less common than doctrinal changes.
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and including, outright expulsion from the faith. Doctrinal requirements for modest dress,
patriarchy, and restraint of vices are widely observed, placing the Witnesses at odds with
larger society. This would be an instance of the DEC(dce) equilibrium, similar to the equi-
librium for the Amish described above, but with the relative importance of enforcement and
commitment reversed.
With high norm salience, the doctrine norm will take precedence. An example of this sce-
nario is the cultural dominance of Catholicism in the Boston Archdiocese, where about half
the local population identifies as Catholic. Many members exhibit little commitment out-
side of attending the occasional mass, and do nothing to enforce doctrine, yet culturally the
church continues to have massive influence – even in the wake of recent scandals. This would
be an instance of the DCE(ecd) equilibrium. Of course, if norm salience were to fall enough,
this equilibrium would shift. Although, there have been some recent reorganizations in this
Archdiocese, there is not yet signs of escalating enforcement or commitment norms.
As a final example, consider the case of evangelical megachurches. Such churches are fre-
quently found in the suburbs of rapidly growing urban areas, where they can draw members
from a wide area. Few members are asked to do any more than attend a weekly sermon,
which is usually plain spoken and light on theological terminology. Doctrinal requirements
are mostly in the realm of private conduct, and offering plates are rarely used. On the
other hand, the private conduct that is regulated (mostly related to sexuality) is frequently
the topic of sermons and a major focus of members. This would be the ECD(dce) equilib-
rium, where enforcement dominates the other norms, and is a product of low norm salience
(drawing members from a wide area of a secularizing society) and where punishment is weak.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper builds upon the familiar economics of religion framework, where an organization
providing a club good uses strict practices to screen out free riders, by decomposing the
concept of strictness. Key to the expanded environment is the addition of enforcement,
where some of members’ effort increases the penalty for failing to contribute. In addition,
since different portions of the population will contribute different types and amounts of effort,
the environment results in a multi-dimensional classification system for religious groups. The
dynamic extensions pare down the classifications to a handful of stable outcomes that would
be most commonly observed.
The model indicates that a mature faith whose norms are highly salient to the population will
likely exhibit marginal contributors following the doctrines of the faith but whose material
and enforcement efforts are negligible. By contrast a faith whose norms have low salience
among the population can exhibit marginal enforcement or marginal material commitment,
if the effect of punishment is weak. In other words, we would expect most faiths to exhibit
marginal doctrinal observance, except in the case where norm salience is low and punishment
is weak.
Finally, the use of a norm-utility framework helps neatly explain variations in effort within a
faith community. The norms reflect an ideal for members to aspire to, but actual effort falls
short to varying degrees based on individual norm salience. Changes in the distribution of
norm salience, either due to secular trends or due to expansion of a faith into new cultural
contexts, can result in a new equilibrium that transforms the faith group or causes a schism.
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Chapter 3
Capital Reallocation, Search-in-Use,
and Growth
I develop a growth model with a decentralized market for physical capital that allows for
reallocation of both idle and currently active units. Capital is reallocated among firms with
a common technology, yet generates a dispersion of rental rates, consistent with empirical
observations of commercial real estate markets. In equilibrium some measure of capital is
always idle due to search frictions, and this reduces the endogenous savings rate. Steady-
state output is found to be increasing in the degree of “search-in-use” – the extent to which
reallocation occurs for capital that is currently active. Extensions allow for endogenous
savings and transfers to increase saving. Calibration demonstrates that the model can easily
account for observed savings rates below that implied by a standard neoclassical growth
model.
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3.1 Introduction
Effective allocation of capital to productive use is vital to long-term economic growth, as
well as providing the incentive for capital accumulation. Many physical capital markets ex-
hibit a chronic share of capital that is idle, as well as dispersion in rents that are not easily
explainable by heterogeneity in the capital itself. My proposed theory is that frictions asso-
ciated with capital reallocation diminish the incentive to save, create a dispersion in rates
of return on capital, and that policies that diminish these frictions will lead ultimately to
higher growth.
Recent literature has established that markets for physical capital exhibit substantial fric-
tions, and have large secondary markets. The paper most responsible for increased interest
in these markets is Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), which estimated that reallocation of exist-
ing capital amounts to 30% of annual expenditures on physical capital and found substantial
dispersion in Tobin’s q, which implies dispersion in the value of capital. Slightly earlier,
Ramey and Shapiro (2001) demonstrated that capital goods are often on the market while
in operation for an extended period before sale and transfer occurs, a situation correlated
with frictions due to specificity of capital.
In Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007), commercial real estate vacancy rates are among
many examples given of capital market frictions, and studies such as Tse and Fischer (2003)
show that high commercial vacancies are an international phenomenon. This example of idle
capital is particularly intriguing, since office and retail space is among the most homogeneous
of capital goods. Location and amenities do vary, of course, but variations in rents are found
even with the same building (see the discussion of concessions in the literature section).
The application of search models to capital markets is relatively new, and most attempts so
far have placed capital goods in one of two states: not-searching but active, or searching but
idle. However, in the labor search literature we find that allowing for search-on-the-job can
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provide a richer explanation of wage dispersion and capture the phenomenon of job-to-job
transitions with no intervening period of unemployment. Comparably, in capital markets
one frequently finds search-in-use, where currently active capital is also being offered for sale
or rent in secondary markets, as well as dispersion in rental rates. Thus it seems natural to
adapt search-on-the-job models into a model of search-in-use.
The basic structure of the model is a Solow-type growth model with a frictional capital
market similar to the labor market model found in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The
frictional capital market is coupled with a frictionless labor market both for tractability and
to allow the growth features of the model to mimic the widely known Solow model. Most
macro models with both labor and capital make the reverse simplification – a frictional labor
market and frictionless capital markets. This modeling choice is further justified below by
providing evidence that frictions are at least as significant in capital markets as in labor
markets.
Idle capital in the model is directly analogous to unemployment in labor models, in that
capital owners are searching for firms to use their capital but are currently unmatched. This
is not to be confused with capacity utilization where a firm has access to capital that they are
currently declining to use. Capacity utilization would reflect capital goods that are “outside
the capital force” to continue the labor market analogy. An example of a measure that would
properly capture “unemployed” capital is vacancy rates for non-residential real estate, which
is the primary setting in mind for the model.
The model will include several known features of physical capital markets. First, there will
be equilibrium unemployment, caused by search frictions. Changes in use will be described
partly by exogenous deactivation (similar to separation in labor models) but also by search-
in-use, where units of capital can find increasingly better rental rates. Finally, the structure
of rents will exhibit dispersion.
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3.2 Literature and Motivating Evidence
This section will first address the existing evidence for substantial frictions in markets for
physical capital. After establishing these features, I will discuss recent theoretical explo-
rations of capital markets, most of which are presently working papers.
3.2.1 Empirical Evidence
General evidence of capital market frictions can be found in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006). As
noted above, reallocation is a sizable share of capital expenditures. Somewhat surprisingly,
reallocation is procyclical, i.e. used capital markets “seize up” during recessions. This
phenomenon strongly implies search frictions in capital markets, since otherwise one would
expect used capital to be quickly reallocated as firms restructure in response to economic
conditions. While the authors do not provide direct evidence of rental rate or price dispersion,
they do show persistent dispersion in Tobin’s q (stock value over asset value). In the model
below, profits over capital stock would exhibit dispersion as a side effect of the underlying
rent dispersion, which is consistent with this data.
The phenomena of idle capital is related to capital misallocation studied in Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), although the proposed mechanism is different. Hsieh & Klenow’s model does not have
idle capital, but instead has capital that is located in less productive firms. By comparing
the dispersion of marginal products across countries they find that much of the cross-country
differences attributed to TFP may in fact be allocative inefficiencies. Similarly, the model
below would imply that countries with identical technology could still have substantially
different levels of output. The institutional problems (corruption and legal monopoly) that
H&K draw attention to, could also create differences in capital market frictions that would
create similar performance gaps.
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A well-documented aspect of capital goods that can generate search frictions is specificity.
The study of aerospace plant closings in Ramey and Shapiro (2001) found that although
the highly specialized equipment used in that industry was difficult to sell cross-industry,
such sales did occur – typically with a haircut. Also, equipment up for sale nearly always
continued in use while the owner searched for a buyer.
The above papers establish the basic contours of capital markets. The following stylized
facts will be elaborated further below:
• Substantial frictions with persistent idle capital
• Robust rental and secondary markets (establishing search-in-use)
• Dispersion of rental rates and prices
To establish the degree of frictions present, I obtained national level data on non-residential
real estate from Reis, Inc. As can be seen below, vacancy rates in these markets are large
and exceed the labor market unemployment rate over the entire series. Vacancy rates in the
5 − 20% range are not unique to the U.S., and have been found in the UK and Australia
(Tse and Fischer (2003))an even in rapidly developing economies like China (Ke and White
(2013)). Another relevant aspect of non-residential real estate is the widespread practice of
concessions. This is where property owners reduce the asking rent for a property in order
to lure and retain tenants. Concessions data is anonymous, but aggregated such that an
effective rent can be calculated relative to the asking rent. This practice is so common that
commercial real estate over the period for which data was available, the average effective
rent is only 85% of the asking rent. The practice of concessions is masking a high degree of
rent dispersion, even across tenants in the same building (which is why survey respondents
insist on the data being anonymous).
Vacancy rates appear to act as a signal for new construction, per Eppli and Shilling (1995).
73
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0
4%
8%
12%
16%
20%
Vacancy Rates for Non-Residential Real Estate
Office
Labor
Industrial
Retail
U.S. Composite of major Metro Area, Source: Reis, Inc.
Figure 3.1: Vacancy Rate Comparison
However, the lag between initiation of a project and finished construction often leads to
vacancies even for brand new properties. Rent levels for real estate are inversely related
to vacancies (Wheaton et al. (1997)), but there is also variation due to time-on-the-market
(Piazzesi et al. (2013)). This demonstrates the core nature of rent dispersion in the model,
that rents are higher when there is a brief vacancy (search-in-use) versus a long vacancy
(separation).
As noted above, Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) point to commercial real estate
vacancy rates as evidence of capital market frictions. In addition, the authors use inventory
data from manufacturers of physical capital to determine a hazard rate for delivery of new
capital. That these rates are measurably below unity (as low as 0.7 for heavy machinery)
indicates that even new capital is subject to search frictions in initial allocation. Other
general evidence for capital price dispersion can be found across sectors as in Arnade and
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Gopinath (1998), and contrasting new versus used prices as in Lanteri (2017). Price data in
Lantieri also demonstrates higher volatility in the price dispersion of used capital.
Additional evidence comes from secondary markets for commercial aircraft. Similarly to the
real estate data, Pulvino (1998) finds that aircraft sales prices vary inversely with search time.
The secondary markets for aircraft are quite robust due to leasing by the first user of the
aircraft, per Gilligan (2004). According to Gavazza (2011), used aircraft sales are more than
three times the volume of new purchases, even though the search times are usually months
long. In a follow-up, Gavazza (2016) compared aircraft secondary markets to a hypothetical
Walrasian benchmark and estimated that 18% of commercial aircraft are misallocated at
any given time.
The choice of a single depreciation rate for the model, regardless of whether capital is active
or idle is a convenient simplification, but also has some empirical support. Per Boucekkine
et al. (2009), obsolescence is a major component of depreciation, and this will eventually
render capital worthless regardless of use.
3.2.2 Theoretical Literature
As noted above, the model below draws from Burdett and Mortensen (1998), a labor search
model where a distribution of wages forms among homogeneous workers entirely due to
search frictions and differences in firm size. However the quantity of workers is a continuum
of fixed size, and the main difference in the model below is that units of capital (the equiva-
lent of a BM worker) are a stock that grows with investment and shrinks with depreciation.
In Robin and Roux (2002), the authors resolved a concern that the Burdett & Mortensen
dispersion result was dependent on the matching technology, showing that only an economy
where job finding rates were perfectly proportional to firm size would result in a degenerate
distribution.
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There are a wide variety of other labor search models, many of which employ the framework
from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The model below avoids this framework since the
baseline model has single worker firms (analogously, a single unit of capital) and a common
wage rate (i.e. rental rate), and deviations from this require the addition of ex ante hetero-
geneity. However, since capital good heterogeneity can manifest through everything from
scale to irreversibility to productivity differences, the specific form of any ex-ante hetero-
geneity will drive the results of the model. Using a framework where all of these differences
are subsumed into the matching technology results in a rent distribution even when capital
goods are homogeneous.
In Bai et al. (2011) a matching market for final goods causes variable demand and this is
combined with each firm having a location and a matching market for capital goods. Their
model yields plausible capacity utilization dynamics, and is one the first papers using search
frictions to examine capital markets. Another notable model is Kurmann (2014), where a
capital goods matching market incentivizes firms to overinvest in capital. While technically
all capital in Kurmann’s model is active (there is just an inefficient quantity), the model is
suggestive of how search frictions could be a useful paradigm for describing capital markets.
This overinvestment result also appears in a subsequent paper, Kurmann and Rabinovich
(2018) – a variation on Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). In both of these models, firms are
using overinvestment to improve their bargaining position.
Ottonello (2015) directly labels capital unused due to allocative frictions as unemployed, an
intentional analogy to labor markets. Their basic model has a series of submarkets, each
with its own market tightness, and firms select which to enter in order to obtain capital.
There is an extension which yields dispersion, but this is reliant on adding ex-ante hetero-
geneity. The allocations are efficient due to directed search, where both capital owners and
firms have complete control over which submarket they enter.1
1The haircuts for cross-industry sales of capital mentioned in Ramey and Shapiro (2001) suggests free
entry into submarkets may be too strong an assumption. On the other hand, my model places bargaining
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Another recent capital search model is Shi and Cao (2015). They investigate the procyclical
behavior of capital reallocation (which is the opposite of what many models would predict),
and show that a frictional capital market can result in less clearing in recessionary condi-
tions. Unlike other attempts to model these markets, new capital enters its life in an active
state and is later able to be sold in secondary markets2. Dispersion in Tobin’s q is addressed
in Dong et al. (2016), a capital search model where firms are able to vary in size. Like
all of the above models, there is no search-in-use, and all dispersion is created by ex-ante
heterogeneity (in this case, in productivity).
3.3 Basic Model
In all versions of the model, agents are infinitely lived and represented in continuous time.
There exists a unit continuum of firms that are non-discounting profit maximizers with a
Cobb-Douglas production technology accepting labor and capital inputs. There also exists a
measure L of households that are non-discounting consumption maximizers. Finally, there is
a unit measure of non-discounting, profit maximizing intermediaries that convert household
savings into capital and pay a dividend to the households. The intermediaries rent their
capital to the firms, and households provide labor to the firms for wages. In the basic model,
households have an exogenous savings rate s and consume the remainder of their income.
Many of these assumptions will be relaxed in the extensions.
power in the hands of capital users which would seem to err in the opposite manner.
2Frictionless matching of new capital is not empirically accurate either, but new capital allocation certainly
faces fewer frictions than used capital.
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3.3.1 Environment
The firms’ production technology is:
Y = zKαL1−α
where z and α are common to all firms, K is the amount of capital rented by the firm and L
is the amount of labor the firm employs. Labor is obtained through a frictionless market at
wage w. To obtain capital, firms post an offer of a rental rate r. The offer distribution will
be denoted P (r), and the distribution of capital actively used in production will be called
A(r).
Intermediaries attempt to find firms to rent their capital to, and inactive units of capital
will encounter firms at Poisson rate λ. A share of active capital η ∈ (0, 1) will also search3,
thus active capital encounters new firms at the rate ηλ. Active capital becomes inactive
at an exogenous deactivation rate d. The share of capital that is vacant (idle), v, will be
determined endogenously.
All of the above is directly analogous to the wage posting mechanism and matching rates
featured in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). A key difference is that the supply of the in-
put good is endogenous. Specifically, the intermediaries accumulate a stock of capital that
depreciates at rate δ and this is funded by accepting investment of households’ savings in
return for paying them a dividend i per unit of capital created. The investment market is
frictionless, and savings are converted to capital 1 : 1. Finally, households save an exogenous
share of total output s. The figure below depicts the model environment.
3If η ≥ 1, this could result in the reservation rent being zero or even negative. In a labor market model,
this situation (akin to an unpaid internship) is potentially reasonable, but capital markets do not appear to
exhibit non-positive rents and thus I exclude these parameter values as unrepresentative of the phenomena
of interest.
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Figure 3.2: Model Diagram
3.3.2 Equilibrium
Given the growth model elements of the environment, I focus on a steady-state equilibrium
where active capital per worker is constant. A steady state implies a stationary rent distri-
bution, wage level, and a specific vacancy rate for capital, as described below. Using the
production function and aggregate quantities, we can express a law of motion for the overall
capital stock:
K˙ = sz ((1− v)K)α L1−α − δK (3.1)
Thus steady state active capital per worker (ka) will be:
ka =
(
sz(1− v)
δ
) 1
1−α
(3.2)
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This capital per worker expression is just the familiar Solow result reduced by the effect of
vacancies. To pin down the vacancy rate, we can observe the flow of capital from the active
(KA) to inactive (KI) state.
K˙I = dKA − λKI − δKI + szKαAL1−α (3.3)
Since K˙I = 0 in a steady state, and v ≡ KI/K by definition:
v∗ =
d+ δ
λ+ d+ δ
(3.4)
The vacancy rate expression is, unsurprisingly, very similar to that found in labor search
models where the equilibrium unemployment rate is the factors causing separation, divided
by separation plus the finding rate. Equations (2) and (4) will be useful for substitution
later. Turning to the firm’s problem, their profits are
pi(r) = z n(r)α`(r)1−α − r n(r) − w`(r) (3.5)
where firms offer a rent r to obtain capital quantity n(r) and hire labor quantity `(r). Since
the labor market is frictionless, there will be a single wage equal to the marginal product of
labor and this in turn means that active capital per worker will equalize across all firms in
equilibrium. This is true along any point on an equilibrium path, not just at a steady state.
This means that a firm’s choice of rent will, on its own, fully determine their level of profit.
At the steady state, n(r)
`(r)
would equal ka for all r.
When a unit of capital encounters a firm, the intermediary owner will have the option to
accept or reject the firm’s rent offer. This implies a reservation rent for inactive capital (r)
and that any offers made to active capital will need to exceed the current rent in order to be
accepted. As a result of the latter (intermediaries “trading up” for higher rates of return),
a firm can potentially obtain more capital by offering a higher rental rate. The steady state
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flow of capital in and out of active status up to a particular offered return r is:
v λ P (r)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflows
= (1− v)A(r) {d+ δ + ηλ[1− P (r)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflows
(3.6)
Rearranging this yields an expression for the active capital distribution in terms of the
posting distribution:
A(r) =
vλP (r)
(1− v)(d+ δ + ηλ[1− P (r)]) (3.7)
The law of motion for capital flows through firms offering rent r would be:
n˙(r) = −{d+ δ + ηλ[1− P (r)]} n(r) + vλK + (1− v)ηλA(r)K (3.8)
At a steady state, where n˙(r) = 0, and substituting for A(r) yields capital per firm in terms
of the posting distribution:
n(r) =
vλ(d+ δ + ηλ)K
{d+ δ + ηλ[1− P (r)]}2 (3.9)
Since P (r) is a cdf, we observe that capital per firm will be increasing in r. If there were a
discontinuity in the posting distribution, n(r) would be weakly decreasing in r. However, a
discontinuity in the rent distribution is not incentive compatible. Consider a discontinuity
from r1 to r2 with r2 > r1. A firm at r2 would be able to poach capital from any firm posting
a rent between r and r1. But this would still be the case if that firm lowered its rent offer
to some value r′ where r1 < r′ < r2 and the firm’s profits would increase since their cost of
capital would fall with no change in the amount of capital they would attract. Thus P (r)
must be continuous in equilibrium, meaning that capital per firm is strictly increasing in the
rent offer.
Since firms can freely change their rent at any time, and since any r ≥ r will yield a positive
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quantity of capital, paying a rent above the reservation rent must be at least as good as
the outcome when offering r. But if a firm is earning high profits at a higher rent, this
will induce other firms to increase their rent above them, which in turn would reduce the
amount of capital they are able to attract and lower their profits. Thus, in equilibrium, firms
will end up with rent offers such that they are indifferent between continuing to post r or
switching to posting r forever. With no discounting, this is an equal profit condition. Profit
equivalence and the n(r) expression yields the posting distribution:
P (r) =
(d+ δ + ηλ)
ηλ
(
1 −
(
αzkα−1a − r
αzkα−1a − r
) 1
2
)
(3.10)
Note that P (r¯) = 1 which implies:
r¯ = αzkα−1a − (αzkα−1a − r)
(
d+ δ
d+ δ + ηλ
)2
(3.11)
Turning to the intermediaries, we need to determine the reservation rent that they will
accept from firms. Given that being matched reduces the arrival of new matches (due to
the search-in-use parameter, η), a very low rent offer will be rejected since it will be better
to wait for a higher offer. Value functions for a unit of capital require a distinction between
inactive capital VI and active capital at a particular rental rate VA(r). Without discounting,
the intermediary is assessing the expected useful life of their capital, determined by the
depreciation rate.
δVI = λ
[∫ r¯
r
VA(x) dP (x) − VI
]
(3.12)
δVA(r) = r + ηλ
[∫ r¯
r
VA(x) − VA(r) dP (x)
]
+ d [VI − VA(r)] (3.13)
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Note that r¯ is the rental rate offered by the largest firm. Combined with the condition that
VA(r) = VI , the above equations can be solved to obtain:
r = (1− η)λ
∫ r¯
r
1− P (x)
d+ δ + ηλ[1− P (x)]dx (3.14)
We can then evaluate the reservation rent condition above to produce an equation relating
r to r¯, that combined with (11) obtains a closed form expression for the reservation rent.
r =
αδ
s
(
λ+ d+ δ
λ
)[
(1− η)ηλ2
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 + (1− η)ηλ2
]
(3.15)
And thus, the rent dispersion is:
r¯ − r = αδ
s
(
λ+ d+ δ
λ
)[
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 − (d+ δ)2
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 + (1− η)ηλ2
]
(3.16)
Note that setting the search-in-use parameter (η) to zero will remove all dispersion, and the
posting and active capital distributions will both be degenerate. The ex-post heterogeneity
in rental rates is entirely due to intermediaries’ ability to “trade up” when they receive a
higher rent offer. Due to perfect competition in the investment market, the intermediaries
will pay a common dividend to all households based on the expected rent paid on active
capital.
Er(1− v)K = iK (3.17)
And evaluating Er by integrating over the active capital distribution yields:
Er = αzkα−1a
[
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 − (d+ δ)2 − v
1−vηλ
2
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 + (1− η)ηλ2
]
(3.18)
The households in the basic model have an exogenous savings rate and are price takers in
both the labor and investment markets, so their behavior is automatic. However, since s is
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Factor Increasing in: Decreasing in:
Output α, s, z, λ d, δ
Vacancy Rate d, δ λ
Rent Dispersion α, η, d, δ s, λ
Figure 3.3: Comparative Statics
defined as the share of total output, the above equilibrium solution has assumed that the
output share going to the firms is no larger than 1 − s. This is guaranteed to hold for any
s ≤ 1 − α, since the labor share of income will always flow to the household, regardless of
the amount of frictions in the capital market. Given the typical observed values of the labor
share and savings rate, this is a trivial restriction.
Altogether, an equilibrium is a tuple (v, K, i, w, r, P , pi), such that both the labor and
investment markets clear, and where the capital market follows:
pi(r|r, P ) = pi ∀ r on P
pi(r|r, P ) ≤ pi otherwise
At a steady state, equations (2), (4), and (16) will hold as well.
3.3.3 Analysis
As expected, the basic model results in equilibrium idle capital (the vacancy rate), for any
positive, finite search rate λ. Also, as the search speed falls (capital market frictions increase),
steady state output is reduced. The existence of search-in-use creates an endogenous rent
dispersion, however in this environment the search-in-use parameter (η) does not affect
overall output. In the next section, endogenous savings will create a link between search-in-
use and steady state output. The basic model yields intuitive comparative statics.
Note that the direct effect of increased savings is to make it easier for firms to obtain
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Figure 3.4: Dispersion and Search-in-Use
capital, thus reducing their need to bid up to capture larger quantities and reducing rent
dispersion. Specifically, both the reservation and maximum rents fall, but the maximum
rent falls faster. Search-in-use (η) is crucial to generating dispersion, but greater matching
efficiency will diminish dispersion. The figure below clarifies the relationship between the
search-in-use parameter and the dispersion. While the reservation rent has a non-monotonic
relationship, the range increases monotonically in η. Also, the distribution is increasingly
skewed toward the ceiling rent as η increases.
The basic model would yield transition dynamics familiar from any Solow-type model. A
parameter change causes most endogenous variables to adjust over time to the new steady-
state. One major exception is, of course, a change in the savings rate, which would cause an
immediate change in household consumption followed by slow adjustment to the steady state.
Less obvious is that changes to either search parameter (η, λ) will also cause immediate
changes, since those parameters affect the value of capital for intermediaries causing the
reservation rent to jump.
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3.4 Endogenous Savings
Two endogenous savings models are provided below. The first imposes future discounting
on the households only, while the second has all agents discounting. They are presented
separately since the latter case notably alters the equilibrium in the capital market from that
described in the basic model, by causing firm profits to be increasing in firm size. Presenting
the two cases separately will clearly distinguish between the results changed by endogenous
household saving, and the results changed due to discounting by firms and intermediaries.
In all cases, agents with discounting shall have CRRA utility in consumption. However,
since capital can only be created by the intermediaries, firms will have no incentive to save.
In a later extension, I experiment with transferring firm profits to the households in order
to boost capital growth. The present version of the model can be interpreted as a complete
separation of production decisions from capital accumulation decisions. This is admittedly
an extreme assumption, but the claim that these two decisions are perfectly harmonized in
actual economies is similarly suspicious. The transfer extension will explore the full range of
possibilities and clarify in what ways capital market frictions will continue to reduce output
even if households are given all of firm profits.
3.4.1 Household Discounting
If households alone discount the future at rate ρ, they face the problem:
max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c(t)1−θ
1− θ dt (3.19)
s.t. k˙(t) = (i(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t) − c(t) (3.20)
86
Per the basic model, the household is actually accumulating a stock of assets linked to the
capital held by the intermediaries which pays a dividend for the life of the capital. For
simplicity, the household budget constraint is written in terms of capital since the two are
always equivalent. Using the household’s problem, we can form a Hamiltonian in terms of c
and k:
H(c, k, χ) =
c1−θ
1− θ +
χ[(i− δ)k + w − c] (3.21)
Solving this yields the consumption path:
c˙
c
=
1
θ
[ρ + δ − i] (3.22)
Thus at the steady state i = ρ + δ, and per the intermediary equilibrium (17) and expected
rent (18), this can be combined with the vacancy rate (4) and active capital per worker (2)
to obtain the savings rate.
s =
αδ
δ + ρ
[
ηλ(d+ δ + ηλ)
(d+ δ + ηλ)2 + (1− η)ηλ2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ
(3.23)
The reader may notice that the portion to the left of ψ is the standard result for a neoclassical
growth model. The effect of capital market frictions is encapsulated within ψ. Observe that
ψ ≤ 1 and that:
lim
λ→∞
ψ = η
And since η = 1 would be where search-in-use is just as fast as matching idle capital, this
means that ψ = 1 when frictions are removed, yielding the standard result. Setting η = 1
where λ is still finite reduces ψ to 1 − v, or the rate at which capital is active. Even with
perfect search-in-use, savings would still be below the neo-classical result.
The shares of total output going to each type of agent are α(1−ψ) to firms, none to interme-
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Factor Increasing in: Decreasing in:
Savings Rate α, η, d, δ λ4, ρ
Output α, z, η, λ d, δ, ρ
Vacancy Rate d, δ λ
Rent Dispersion η, d, δ, ρ λ
Figure 3.5: Statics - Endogenous Savings
diaries, and αψ + (1−α) to households. Endogenous savings produces some adjustments to
the comparative statics: Increasing the search-in-use parameter (faster reallocation of cap-
ital) now increases steady state output. Greater search-in-use means higher expected rent,
and capital thus becomes more valuable. As for transition dynamics, with the savings rate
endogenized, any parameter change will cause an immediate change in consumption.
3.4.2 General Discounting
If all agents have preferences of the form given in (19), this alters the structure of the capital
allocation market. As before, we are solving for the steady state equilibrium. The value
function of a firm posting rent r at some candidate steady state would be:
ρV (n(r)) = z n(r)α`(r)1−α − r n(r) − w`(r) (3.24)
Firms still choose their rent level such that they are indifferent between posting r or switching
to posting the reservation rent. Let Vˆ (n(r)) be the value of switching to the reservation rent,
and let pi(r) be the profit flow to a firm posting the reservation rent. Standard dynamic
programming arguments imply:
ρVˆ (n) − Vˆ ′(n)n˙ = pi(r) (3.25)
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Since firms choose r such that V (n) = Vˆ (n) at the steady state, the equilibrium value of a
firm is:
V (n) =
pi(r)
ρ+ d+ δ + ηλ
[
n(r) +
λvK
ρ
]
(3.26)
The expression for firm size, n(r), is unchanged from the basic model. This means that unlike
the basic model where profits are equal across all firms, profits are increasing in the rent
offer. This result is intuitive since, with discounting, the windfall from a firm lowering their
rent offer needs to be balanced against the lower profits they would earn in the future. As
ρ increases, the profit premium for larger firms increases. Using this profit function and the
firm size expression one can derive the posting distribution and active capital distribution.
P (r) =
(d+ δ + ηλ)
ηλ
[
1 −
(
αzkα−1a − r
αzkα−1a − r
− ρ(r − r)
(d+ δ + ηλ)(αzkα−1a − r)
) 1
2
]
(3.27)
A(r) =
(d+ δ + ηλ)
ηλ
[
1 −
(
n(r)
n(r)
) 1
2
]
(3.28)
The model with discounting for all agents reduces the rent dispersion relative to the basic
model. This can be seen by comparing (27) to (10). Since the rent dispersion is reduced,
this implies that expected rent is decreasing in the discount factor (ρ). This in turn means
smaller dividends paid to households (i), and reduced incentive to save. The expressions are
considerably more cumbersome, and only suitable for numeric analysis. For purposes of this
paper it is only necessary to note that a model where only households discount the future is
likely to somewhat overestimate the rent dispersion.
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3.5 Transfer to Households
As noted above, a reasonable objection can be raised about firms consuming their profits.
In practice, firm managers do not simply binge on their profits, but often either reinvest
those profits or transfer them to shareholders. Thus, the model above, when calibrated,
would likely result in far too low of a savings rate. This is in fact what we will see in the
next section. In this section, I introduce a simple transfer of profits from the firm to the
household.
I will start with the endogenous saving model where only households discount (3.1) and
include a tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1] on Firm profits. All of the taxed profits are transfered to the
households as T = τΠ
L
where Π is total firm profits. At τ = 0, this is identical to the model
above. At τ = 1, this is equivalent to endowing the households with a balanced portfolio of
shares in the firms. The calibration section includes a discussion of the possible causes of
intermediate values of τ .
The transfer changes the household budget constraint to:
k˙(t) = (i(t)− δ)k(t) + w(t) + T (t) − c(t) (3.29)
T (t) =
τ
L
[
z((1− v(t))K(t))αL1−α − Er(t)(1− v(t))K(t) − w(t)L] (3.30)
This, in turn, adjusts the household Hamiltonian:
H(c, k, χ) =
c1−θ
1− θ +
χ [(i− δ)k + (1− τ)w + τz(1− v)αkα
− τEr(1− v)k − c] (3.31)
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Solving this yields a more complicated consumption path:
c˙
c
=
1
θ
[
ρ + δ − i − ατz(1− v)αkα−1 + τEr(1− v)] (3.32)
The steady state savings rate is recovered using the same methods as previously described,
and is written in terms of the composite parameter ψ for clarity.
s =
αδ
δ + ρ
[ψ − τ(ψ − 1)] (3.33)
If we consider the case of τ = 1, the savings rate will be equivalent to the neo-classical growth
model solution. Output would still be reduced due to some capital being idle. Thus, the
undersaving that occurs for τ < 1 results from an imperfect connection between the profit
maximization decisions of the firm and the investment decisions of households interacting
with frictions in the capital market.
3.6 Calibration
To assess validity, I perform a calibration exercise using the transfer extension of the model.
The years 1999 to 2016 are used since that is the range for which U.S. commercial real
estate vacancy rates were available. Lacking a good proxy for the contact rate (λ), the
observed vacancy rates5 are used to back out this value. Using the median calculated λ and
the typical commercial lease duration of four years, a value for the search-in-use parameter
(η) was inferred. Essentially, this assumes that typical lease length is determined by the
likelihood that active capital becomes matched.
Observed savings rates are determined using gross private saving and nominal GDP from
FRED, which averages 19.9%, and is countercyclical. The targets are the rent dispersion
5Data obtained from Reis, Inc. covering a composite of all U.S. major metro areas.
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Parameter Value Source
α 0.357− 0.435 BLS labor share data
d 0.069− 0.096 BLS establishment data
δ 0.1 Eisfeldt & Rampini, 2006
η 0.23 Described above
λ 0.908− 2.238 Described above
ρ 0.012− 0.04 Otrok, 2001 and E&R
Figure 3.6: Calibration Parameters
ratio (highest over lowest rent) and the value of τ needed to achieve the observed savings
rates. The assumed discount rate has a significant effect on the optimal saving rate, and
this affects the τ estimate. The high discount rate value is taken from Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2006), while the low value is from Otrok (2001). These imply a mean optimal frictionless
saving rate of 28.9% and 36.2% respectively.
Observed vacancy rates and dispersion ratios use a composite of office and retail real estate
scaled based on square feet per employed worker. The dispersion ratio used is based on
twice the gap between asking and effective rents. This is admittedly a coarse measure of
dispersion, but if we assume rough symmetry of the distribution, and that the asking rent
represents the maximum this should be a fair approximation. In addition, since this measure
is a ratio, any heterogeneity due to differences in locations or amenities are averaged out.
The calibrated dispersion ratios that result are all somewhat larger than the observed val-
ues. The mean calibrated dispersion ratio is 1.712, while the mean observed ratio is 1.441.
As noted above, a version of the model that neglects discounting by the firms yields larger
dispersion than one that does. Since the calibration uses the simpler model, this is expected.
With regard to savings rates, the calibrated model with no transfers to households (τ = 0)
would yield savings rates that are far too low, with a mean savings rate of 9.8% for the low
discount rate, and 7.9% for the high discount rate. To produce the observed savings rates
would require the mean transfer share (τ) to be 0.380 for the low discount rate, and 0.569
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for the high discount rate. The transfer shares also exhibit a countercyclical pattern, which
may hint at the underlying cause of these mid-range values for τ .
The reader might have expected that τ should be very close to one, since real world firms
either reinvest their profits or pass dividends to shareholders who engage in saving behav-
ior. Under this perspective, the calibrated transfer shares are surprising, suggesting that a
substantial amount of firm profits are simply consumed. Several explanations suggest them-
selves. Principal-Agent problems could be causing firm managers to act out of accordance
with shareholder interests. Alternatively, there could be search costs in the capital market
unaccounted for in the model6. Finally, there could be organizational issues where reinvest-
ment by firms is less optimal than broad-based investment by households, and the mid-range
value of τ is reflecting this. Of these possibilities, the last is most likely to have a counter-
cyclical pattern since dividends drop in economic downturns. Nonetheless, the current study
can only highlight this interesting puzzle, and note that frictions in the process of capital
reallocation will exert a depressing effect on investment.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of idle physical capital, which most closely resembles markets
for non-residential real estate. While the model is based on a seminal labor unemployment
model, the addition of depreciation and investment is necessary to capture the unique nature
of capital markets. It is, of course, impossible for households to generate more workers except
in the sense of population growth, which is too slow of a process to matter in unemployment
dynamics. Such is not the case with capital goods, where the creation of new goods, and
their eventual breakdown or obsolescence, is pivotal to the path of the economy.
6A version of the model with a free entry condition for the firms combined with a cost of posting would
yield broadly similar results, except that the entire portion of output currently going to firm profits would
be spent on the posting costs, as firms would enter until profits were zero.
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The model generates two channels by which steady state output is reduced from what would
be implied by a neo-classical benchmark. First, the fact that a share of capital is always
idle decreases production at all times. The second channel is that capital market frictions
can reduce the incentive to invest (undersaving). While this second channel can be shut
down by assuming a perfect transfer of firm profits to households, calibration suggests that
such a model would be inaccurate. The exact mechanisms that give rise to this are left to
further research. For this paper, it is sufficient to point out that frictional capital markets
in a growth model environment can result in undersaving.
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Appendix to Chapter One
To check whether the results are unique to the particular parameter values chosen, we can try
two alternative sets of revenue values. First, we can widen the gap between the enthusiastic
and reluctant managers by using rA = 0 and rB = 3−
√
3. Note that the sum of the revenue
values remain the same in order to ensure a clean comparison. Second, we can remove the
gap between the two managers by setting both r = (3−√3)/2.
For the first check, with the gap in revenues maximized, we can see from the output below
that outcomes are still closer to the first best with a convention than without, and that the
relative performance of the two conventions and the ban environments is unchanged.
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Figure 3.7: Baseline, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.8: Contract Convention, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.9: Merger Convention, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.10: Merger Ban, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.11: Contract Ban, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.12: First Best Comparison, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.13: Baseline, maximum revenue gap
For the second check, with the gap in revenues removed, the differences in outcomes between
the various alternative rules are much narrower, but the relative ranking remains. Thus, the
benefits of adopting a contract or merger convention increase as the degree of asymmetry
between the firms increases.
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Figure 3.14: Contract Convention, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.15: Merger Convention, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.16: Merger Ban, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.17: Contract Ban, maximum revenue gap
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Figure 3.18: First Best Comparison, maximum revenue gap
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Appendix to Chapter Three
Endowing firms with equal productivity is a useful simplification, and although the calibra-
tion focuses on aggregate data over an entire country, a more detailed empirical analysis
would need to take into account variations in firm productivity. As such, I provide here
changes to the model that would be needed to allow for heterogeneity in productivity.
The simplest case is to have two productivity values. The environment would be adjusted
such that firms have productivity zi with i ∈ {L,H}, and where zH > zL. The share of firms
of the high type would be σ, and the posting distributions for the high and low types would
be PH(.) and PL(.), respectively. This implies that:
P (r) = σPH(r) + (1− σ)PL(r)
Proposition: For η > 0, r¯H > rH = r¯L > rL. In other words, the overall posting
distribution is continuous, but all high type postings are greater than all low type postings
in equilibrium. As a proof, assume that there is some r2 ≥ r1, where r2 is in PL(.) and r1 is
in PH(.). Given profit maximization, this implies:
(zH − zL)n(r1)α`(r1)1−α ≥ (zH − zL)n(r2)α`(r2)1−α
The above requires r1 ≥ r2, which can only hold at r1 = r2, thus demonstrating that the
equilibrium must be continuous and non-overlapping in productivity.
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Non-overlap of the postings and a process similar to the derivation of the basic model yields
an expression for the posting distribution:
Pi(r) =
(d+ δ + ηλ)
ηλ
(
1 −
(
αzik
α−1
i − r
αzik
α−1
i − ri
) 1
2
)
Where ki is capital per worker used by type i firms. Due to the single wage, capital per
worker must vary by firm type in order to ensure a common marginal product of labor
across all workers, which means that kL > kH . This new posting distribution has a larger
dispersion than the basic model. If we were to add additional types, the dispersion would
continue to widen. An empirical analysis using firm level data would thus need to take into
account dispersion caused by productivity heterogeneity in order to isolate dispersion caused
by search frictions.
Note that by definition, P (r¯L) = P (rH) = 1−σ. If we select zH and zL such that aggregate
productivity is the same as the single z in the basic model, the average rents will be the
same, meaning that the dividend paid to households will be the same. This in turn, will
cause no change to the saving decision. Thus, heterogeneity in firm productivity expands
the rent distribution but has no other effects.
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